On Sun, Jun 7, 2009 at 10:20 PM, Juho Laatu<[email protected]> wrote: > It could be thus enough to say: > - The electors rank the candidates > according to their preferences. > - If some candidate is preferred over > all other candidates then that > candidate shall be elected.
I think that Smith compliance should be required. Condorcet compliance on its own isn't that great. Frankly, even if 1 condorcet method is better than others, going from plurality to any Condorcet/Smith method is a massive improvement. Also, the benefit to the politicians is pretty small from picking a horrible condorcet method, so hopefully they won't bother (though maybe that is overly trusting). If an added criteria is needed, then maybe add clone independence. However, then you are adding more complexity. "Do you want the voting method to be one where The voters rank the candidates, and, unranked candidates are considered equal worst, and, a candidate is considered preferred to another if he is preferred by a majority of the voters who express a preference, and, If a candidate is ranked first on a majority of the ballots, then that candidate wins, and, if a candidate is preferred to all other candidates, then that candidate wins, and, If every candidate in a group of candidates is preferred to all candidates outside the group, then one of them wins ? " This has some redundant clauses, but adding them actually makes it clearer (I think). In, theory you only need the last one as the other 2 rules automatically follow. Maybe you could submit one that only requires condorcet compliance as the 3 clause is complex. Btw, does Schulze allow equal rankings? ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
