Dear Raph, > Schulze and ranked pairs are the only methods that meet clone > independence and the condorcet rule.
Nope. River, too, of course, meets all three criteria... > > Does ranked pairs fail the Smith criterion? > > I would change B to "If there is a group of candidates all preferred > over all candidates outside the group, then only those candidates may > win and the candidates outside the group may have no effect on the > result". > > If you don't restrict the winner to the Smith set (which your rules > don't necessarily), then you could end up with a non-condorcet method. > > Also, just because the popular/proposed condorcet methods are > excluded by your definition doesn't mean that some other weird method > can't be found that also meets the rule. > > It might be better to just include the reasons that you like Sculze > and use those rules rather than trying to select Sculze by a process > of elimination. > > BTW it would be nice if the wikipedia page would actually contain > something describing Schulze method, not just the heuristics. > The best I have found so far is: > http://rangevoting.org/SchulzeExplan.html > "Therefore, my aim was to find a method that satisfies Condorcet, > monotonicity, clone-immunity, majority for solid coalitions, and > reversal symmetry, and that tends to produce winners with weak worst > pairwise defeats (compared to the worst pairwise defeat of the winner > of Tideman's Ranked Pairs method)." > > Yeah. Though, ofc, Schulze isn't allow to edit the article. > > Could someone on this list give a brief outline or the formal rule ( > actually his statutory rules are probably it)? > > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for > > list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
