>I have never seen persuasive arguments about the incentives for >candidates to be "cooperative" or "confrontational" under various >untried methods. >Kevin Venzke
--I agree. OK, so let's start moving a tiny amount in that direction. To simplify things let's talk about approval voting (the simplest system). Suppose a candidate A by being "cooperative" with B can get a fraction F (0<F<1) of the approve-B disapprove-A voters to also approve A. Suppose a candidate A by being "confrontational" with B can get a fraction F (0<F<1) of the approve-B approve-A voters to disapprove B. And we'll assume there is no way for A to cause a polarity-switch (B-and-not-A switching to A-and-not-B voting). This model is entirely arbitrary and I see no reason to believe it, but what the hell. OK, then it would follow immediately which is the better strategy for A to pursue (confront or cooperate) and we find that it can be either one, it depends on the present vote-counts: If there are more B-but-not-A voters than A-and-B voters, then cooperate. That was assuming A or B is going to win. If however A thinks somebody else (C, D, etc) also might win, then A is not getting much mileage by being confrontational with B. A gets more mileage by cooperativity with B because more A-approvals helps A against all rivals, but fewer B-approvals only helps A versus B, not against C,D. So based on this incredibly naive model, I guess I would conclude that overall, approval voting inspires "cooperation" more than it incentivizes "confrontation." We can make essentially the same hokey model and get the same hokey conclusion about range voting. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
