On Jun 10, 2009, at 1:08 PM, Árpád Magosányi wrote:
Hi!
The underlying assumption of Warren's analysis is that there are two
major candidates, and the voter tries to make one of these
candidates win "at any cost".
I feel uneasy with this assumption, because
- here, now I would not entrust any of the top two candidates, and
the majority of the population is playing "eliminate one of the
candidates at any cost".
- I would prefer a voting system which makes cooperation beneficial,
hence
- I would like to be in a situation where any of the top two
candidates would be largely OK for me, an I could decide between
them based on my pet issues, world view or whatever
What I am missing here is analysis of the impact of voting method on
the strategy of voters and candidates.
I hope a model could be set up which helps to understand this, but I
have only faint ideas about how it could be done.
And I have a question to Warren - or anyone who bothers to answer -
about one of the aspects:
How range voting and Condorcet (specifically Schulze) affects the
chances of a cooperative and a confrontative candidate?
Assuming it is likely that a major candidate will win, and that they
are not equally distasteful (or whatever), I need to vote for the
better of them.
Those of us wanting to promote a third party, and perhaps hoping for a
win this time, need to be able to vote third>bettermajor>other.
Neither Plurality nor Approval provide for expressing our desire and,
perhaps, improving our chances for the next election. Condorcet
offers exactly what we desire; Range ratings can help, but determining
best ratings for Range is more complex.
As to Condorcet, cycles are possible. Not likely, but good to
encourage method to be a flavor of Condorcet whose response to cycles
pleases us most.
Dave Ketchum
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