Now it is July 1 and I have responses from [email protected], [email protected] , Markus Schulze.

Merging is possible, provided each state provides and describes data suitable for this purpose, such as: Condorcet X*X array. Because of possibility of extra candidates from some states, each state should be required to include data for a dummy candidate who gets no votes in that state - such can be included for each such extra candidate. Plurality data - suitable for both states which do Plurality, and for those who use some method not provided for. For such an X*X array is filled out with data as if votes reported had been reported for the candidate strictly preferred by each of the state's voters - and entered in the X*X array as if voted in Condorcet. Approval data - needs thought but my initial thought is as if each approval was a plurality vote - does mean a voter approving 2 gets 2 votes counted but relative counts per candidate comes out ok. IRV or Range - examples of methods that should be avoided by states willing to have their data included - unless they are willing and able to convert to a method that is supported.

Some question merging data from different types of sources - I claim it is doable provided the source type is provided for and the data properly labelled.

Markus Schulze says to use the Schulze method for cycles - that should be considered when agreeing on details. I would add that there should be ONE X*X array for the US for this purpose, so that all cooperating states give the same instructions to their electors.

On Jun 30, 2009, at 11:57 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:

Food for thought:

The "National Popular Vote" effort is a proper attempt to hear voters better in electing a President - votes from all states would get counted, unlike the present problem that, in many states, all of the states electoral votes will go to the known and expected winner of that state's voting - which, in turn, discourages candidates from being much concerned with trying to increase their vote count from such states.

But, how should the votes be counted when merging the votes from multiple states? I suspect Plurality is expected because all states know how to do that.

How about Condorcet? It lets voters express themselves more completely, but then we have to be concerned with some states not being prepared to do Condorcet electing.

I propose here that that is not a proper concern. Condorcet, of course, counts, merging together votes: as in Plurality - and thus could count in votes from states offering only Plurality. as in Approval - assuming, as is proper, that such could be voted in real Condorcet.
    of what Condorcet offers.

Knowing what a voter votes in Plurality or Approval, the counters simply count what would have been counted for the voter if the voter had voted such in a Condorcet election.

This both allows merging together what different states may be prepared to offer, and gives them a path toward general use of Condorcet - a tolerable destination.

Admittedly this ignores such as Range and Borda - but gives voters better power than Plurality, while minimizing what new they could be asked to learn.

Note that Condorcet is more tolerant than most, of different sets of candidates being offered in different states. Conceded that such is undesirable but, assuming Condorcet, voters can both vote what is generally agreed on as to expectable winners, and what odd may be added for their state.

Dave Ketchum


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