Hello Kristofer, your "iterated Copeland" method in the limit of a large number N of iterations, is going to end up caring about the eigenvector of greatest eigenvalue of the matrix M where M[ab]=2 if a beats b M[ab]=1 if a and b tied M[ab]=0 if b beats a Let this "frobenius eigenvector" be x.
It will elect as winner, the guy g such that x[g] is maximized. In a paper of mine I discussed Keener's eigenvector-based voting system and a related (which seemed a little better) idea based on "sinkhorning." See paper #88 here http://www.math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html I had not viewed it in terms of this kind of "iteration" (which consists of just matrix multiplication by M); but it can be viewed that way, which is another interesting way to look at it. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
