Folks, you probably overlooked that I have already described a variant which works *completely* without Random Ballot and will definitely elect one of the top-3 range options (as determined from the 'strategic' ballot):
> Method "Range top-3 runoff" (RT3R) > =================================== > > 1. Each voter separately supplies > a "nomination" range ballot and a "runoff" range ballot. > > 2. From all "nomination" ballots, determine > the options A,B,C with the top-3 total scores a>b>c. > > 3. Let L be the lottery in which B wins with probability > p = max(0,(2b-a-c)/(b-c)) and C wins with probability 1-p. > > 4. Let q be the proportion of "nomination" ballots > on which the lottery L has an expected rating > below the rating of A on that ballot. > > 5. Option A wins if, > on at least the same proportion q of all "runoff" (!) ballots, > the lottery L has an expected rating > below the rating of A on that ballot. > Otherwise B wins with probability p and C wins with probability 1-p. > So if you want it to be as deterministic as possible, you can do it like this or similarly. If you modify it further and set q=1/2, you even get a majoritarian version if you want that. Yours, Jobst Warren Smith schrieb: > --yep. Only reason I did what I did was simplicity (kind of a pain if > voters have to submit > both a range-type and a condorcet or approval-type ballot). > But your way is better in that it tends to yield a better winner than my way. > > Also, note -- which is even more obnoxious -- we could have each voter > submit TWO ratings-style ballots, > the "honest range ballot" and the "dishonest range ballot"; then the > HRB is used to > decide between DHR and random ballot... > > > On 11/20/09, Raph Frank <[email protected]> wrote: >> This is effectively performing random ballot and then giving the >> voters the option to roll the dice a second time. >> >> Any single seat method could be used to select the first candidate. >> If you used a good single seat method to pick the compromise winner, >> then the random ballot would rarely if ever be activated. >> >> For example. >> >> 1) Voters submit ratings ballot and also a ranked or an approval ballot >> 2) Determine the winner using condorcet or approval (or other method) >> 3) Determine the random ballot odds for each candidate >> 4) If a majority prefer the winner in 2 to the expectation in 3), then >> the winner from 2 wins. >> 5) Otherwise, use the random method >> >> Ofc, using a majority instead of a unanimous decision breaks some of >> the properties of the pure consensus method. >> > > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
