Of course, you have to read the voter's mind to know if the change
might have been seen as desirable.
I was into tactics.
One thought I had was a base from which to think of more-or-less
controllable changes: Start with equal size parties and all members
doing bullet voting - result is a tie with all candidates getting
equal votes for and against.
Dave Ketchum
On Nov 25, 2009, at 2:11 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
This is more detailed work, depending on precise knowledge.
Also gets tricky since many changes affect more than one pair of
candidates.
For a simple example where helping A in A vs B, without disturbing
their relationship to other candidates, will help C (could be
hoping to cause A to be bigger than B in their pair; could be
simply to change the magnitude of their difference).
Tell those who would do A=B or B>A, to vote A>B. This will
affect A vs B without affecting any other pair of candidates.
Note that adding one or both of these, or giving them adjacent
ranks when they had not had this, requires more complex analysis.
This was intended to be in the context of, for instance, later-no-
help or mono-raise. These relative criteria are defined as "x should
not be helped/harmed when...". Therefore I don't have the privilege
of telling voters to, for instance, vote A>B instead of A=B - the
simulator just, (in the case of mono-raise) raises a random
candidate and checks if that harms him, or lowers a random candidate
and checks if that helps him.
The hard part is to define "help" and "harm" when either or both of
the outcomes have ties in the social ordering.
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