On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 11:16 AM, Juho <[email protected]> wrote: > The method has some > compromise oriented properties like changing a Condorcet winner to something > else, but the intent (and reason behind this property) was to just elect the > best alternative among the combined result alternatives.
It elects the condorcet option. If it picks ABC over ADE, it is because a majority prefer ABC. It is effectively allowing people to trade with other groups. >> A party could very easily accept an undesired decision in the AvB >> direction in order to get what it wants in the CvD axis. > > Yes, that's what the ratings are used for. > (Possible new findings after the > results of the election have been declared final should maybe be ignored. > Better luck next time :-).) A tie finder could be useful for defeating an unliked outcome. For example, if there was a tie A>B>C>A and only B and C were found, the B wins. > Yes, I think there are many questions where a supermajority could be > required. What I meant was that supermajorities could be used to eliminate options. >> I think it might have some strategy problems. > > Maybe inherited from the ratings side?? What would that be? Not 100% sure :), it might be OK since condorcet is used. If a majority really hate an option, then all wining sets with that option will have a really low rating. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
