Without studying details of the three Romanian candidates and the voters' preferences, the explanation of this majority cycle cannot be known for sure.
However, consider a case of three very similar candidates. The voters' preferences in each of the three possible pairings would be nearly tied (approximately 50% preferring each candidate over each other candidate). In such a case, a cycle involving three small majorities would not be rare. Almost an even bet? --Steve -------------------------- Jameson Quinn wrote: > This is good math, and very interesting, but it doesn't speak at all about > the politics of the matter. Have you figured out any tentative explanation > for the Condorcet cycles you postulate? Why would, for instance, O>B>G > voters be more common than O>G>B voters, yet in the mirror-image votes, > B>G>O voters more common than G>B>O ones? (I realize that the Condorcet > cycle does not require exactly that circumstance, but it suggests > something > of the kind). > > I understand that any such explanation would be post-hoc and speculative, > yet it is still worthwhile to make the attempt. > > Jameson > > 2009/12/8 Warren Smith <[email protected]> > >> preliminary page on Romania 2009 election now available here >> >> http://rangevoting.org/Romania2009.html >> >> The results are not as impressive as I originally thought they were >> going to be. >> -- >> Warren D. Smith ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
