My recent example of four candidates in a planar geometric issue space could be interpreted as an election to determine which of the four towns would host the next harvest ball, or something like that.
The respective town coordinates in miles East and North of town B were (0,2), (0,0), (1,0) and (4,2). The respective town populations were in proportion 2:1:1:1. This leads to the preference profiles 40% A>B>C>D 20% B>C>A>D 20% C>B>A>D 20% D>C>A>B Which makes D a Condorcet loser and creates the cycle A beats B beats C beats A. I want to point out that this example has wiggle room, i.e. both the town distances and the town populations can be perturbed in arbitrary directions without changing the preference profiles, as long as the magnitude of the perturbations are not too large. In other words, the example is not "marginal." ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
