Response to Robert's statement...
"I guess I still haven't heard a good justification for why the Condorcet
winner, if one exists, should *ever* be rejected as the elected winner."
...
Imagine this scenario. ..
A highly polarized electorate with a three candidate race. Only two candidates
are seen by the media and the public as viable, with 49% favoring candidate A
and 46% favoring B, and 5% favoring C slightly over A. Most voters don't know
much about C, but C has carefully avoided alienating any constituency by only
stressing his likeability, rather than issues. However while the supporters of
both A and B don't think much of C they rank C second because they subscribe to
the "anybody but X" notion. The A supporters all rank A>C>B, while the B
supporters all rank B>C>A and the C voters all rank C>A>B
49 A>C>B
46 B>C>A
5 C>A>B
In a traditional runoff or IRV, A would win over B, after C's elimination by 54
to 46. I think that is a reasonable expression of "the public will" though not
the only possible one.
With Condorcet,
C would defeat A by 51 to 49
and C would defeat B by 54 to 46
Thus C is the Condorcet winner.
It is certainly justifiable to argue that C is the "rightful" winner. But it is
not unreasonable to say that C is not the "rightful" winner, since 95% of the
voters are highly dissatisfied with C being elected. This is where the Range
voting utility advocates enter the fray. My point is merely that the
Condorcet-winner criterion is desirable in most cases, but not the only
legitimate, nor ultimate criterion.
Terry Bouricius
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
