Hi,
I've been doing some analysis of strategic voting - specifically,
looking for equilibrium strategies. Nash equilibria are of course not
very useful for elections, because almost anything is a Nash
equilibrium. So I've defined a less inclusive type of equilibrium called
a cabal equilibrium.
The very short version of the result is that most popular voting methods
(plurality, approval, Condorcet, IRV) have a cabal equilibrium iff
there's a Condorcet winner, and a cabal equilibrium always elects a
Condorcet winner.
I have a longer post about this on my blog, here:
http://www.spaceandgames.com/?p=106
The post also links to some of my earlier work on the same topic.
- Peter de Blanc
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