> From: Chris Benham <cbenha...@yahoo.com.au> > To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> > > Rob LeGrand wrote (11 Feb 2010): > > <snip> > > 35:A > 32:B>C > 33:C, > > by which I mean > > 35:A>B=C > 32:B>C>A > 33:C>A=B. > > In this example, C is the Condorcet winner even though C does not have a > majority over B.? I can see how this example could be seen as an > embarrassment to the Condorcet criterion, in that a good method might not > choose C as the winner. > > <end quoted message>
I agree with Chris (below), If you require every winner to "have a majority *over*" ever other candidate, then there is no system that would give you any winners. Clearly above, C has 65 votes and B only has 35 votes, at least in scenario #1 above. Guessing as to what voters really mean, by assuming scenario #2 from scenario #1 -- you may have read the minds of all those voters who you believe all think exactly alike in each category, incorrectly. However, in scenario #2, I think A is the correct winner. I think election methods enthusiasts too often think they can read voters' minds and translate votes between between two different scenarios for voters. Kathy > > Rob, > > Well I can't. Electing A would be a violation of the Minmal Defense criterion, > and electing B would violate Woodall's Plurality criterion and Condorcet > Loser. > > What "good method" do you have in mind that might not elect C? > > And what's good about it? > > Chris Benham > > > > > > -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf Voters Have Reason to Worry http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf Checking election outcome accuracy http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info