does a candidate-elimination method have to be able to eliminate the Condorcet winner in a three-candidate scenario in order to be nonmonotonic with only three candidates?

I'm not quite sure what the intended question is but isn't it enough to eliminate the candidate with most first preference votes unless it is the Condorcet winner. This method will be non-monotonic when there is no Condorcet winner.

Juho


On Feb 20, 2010, at 11:56 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:

Does nonmonotonicity in three-candidate IRV only happen when the Condorcet winner is eliminated?

More generally, does a candidate-elimination method have to be able to eliminate the Condorcet winner in a three-candidate scenario in order to be nonmonotonic with only three candidates?
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