Abd ul, I agree with virtually all you say that I had time to read, but would prefer party list voting over asset voting simply because it forces the #1 elector, as you put it, to state in advance who he will nominate with any excess votes and also in some systems gives the voters a chance to vote for changes in the order of the list. This gives options to those voters who are well-informed that asset voting does not.
Kathy > Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2010 14:53:52 -0500 > From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[email protected]> > To: EM <[email protected]> > Cc: EM <[email protected]> > Subject: [EM] Voting systems theory and proportional representation vs > simple representation. > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed > > Voting systems theory should properly be a subtopic within social > choice theory, which is -- or should not be -- based on instantaneous > process, as from a single ballot, but from the whole set of > procedures whereby a community of interest discovers and makes choices. > > In small-group process, choices by secret ballot are quite unusual, > outside of elections, and, again, in such process, even with secret > ballot (which is by no means universal), voting is traditionally > vote-for-one, with a majority required for a result to be declared, > otherwise the election is null as to legal effect and "must be > repeated," in the language of Robert's Rules of Order. Which means, > among other things, no eliminations are automatic, they are voluntary > or up to whatever renomination process is used. However, the repeated > ballots are based on information from prior ballots as to likely > results, thus the results shift as voters compromise their positions, > with communication outside the ballot process being quite likely. In > the end, the proof of adequate compromise is in a result approved by > a majority, and, in some organizations, even a supermajority is required. > > Generally, standard democratic choice is through votes which are Yes > or No on stated propositions, which are themselves amendable through > Yes or No votes on proposed amendments. The amendment process > typically procedes until there is a supermajority in favor of closing > debate and process on each amendment and then on the main motion. > Thus a single final Yes or No decision may have been preceded by many > polls, compromises, etc. > > Elections with multiple candidates might be seen as an exception; > however, if the majority requirement remains, it represents a > collapse of a longer process that would be the more rarely used > election by orginary motion. Election by motion is, intrinsically, > with adequate participation, Condorcet-compliant, and probably tends > to be more social-utility optimizing than we might expect, in healthy > organizations. > > However, with public elections, and particularly with secret ballot > and the lack of an ability to conduct repeated ballots in short > order, the focus came to be on methods of determining some kind of > ideal winner from a single ballot, and this has suffered from lack of > precision in the definition of "ideal winner," there are competing > criteria that can sound optimal at first blush that may not be so. > Returning to basic social choice process, it is easy to demonstrate > that, under some conditions, the winners required by the Majority > Criterion or the Condorcet Criterion may not be ideal, with ideal > being defined as a result that would be approved by *all* voters > given full information. (I have used the "pizza election" to show > this, with an "ideal result" that would be approved unanimously by > voters, even though the first preference of a supermajority of voters > was different.) > > It is possible to roughly predict such results using social utility > analysis, in situations where true absolute voter utilities are > known. Those situations are rare; however, their value was not > recognized by Arrow et al. Individual voter preferences are not fixed > things, they are an interplay between the voter's ab initio > preferences, which may be initially uninformed, and the preferences > of the rest of the society. It is possible for voter preferences to > actually reverse based on knowledge of the preferences of other voters. > > But when it comes to representation in public process, where scale > does not allow direct participation by all voters, it has sometimes > been assumed that representatives would be chosen based on overall > utility for each choice, and this is diametrically opposite to the > principle of representation by choice, as distinct from > representation by appointment. I.e., the King might appoint a > representative for a colony, that's by appointment, obviously. A > choice of a single representative for a community by majority vote > (or worse, plurality) is representation by election for the community > as a whole. But it is not representation of the individual voters by > choice, and those who did not explicitly accept the winner cannot be > said to be personally represented in whatever decisions the elected > representative makes. > > Proportional representation was intended to address this, bringing, > at least and in theory, various factions to the legislative table so > that they may negotiate more broadly acceptable solutions, which then > become, to the extent that they are, in fact, more broadly accepted, > unifying factors for the society, which increase efficiency and > voluntary compliance and support and a sense of connection with government. > > However, the concept of representation remained collective rather > than personal, severely limiting this approach. Generally, with PR, > it is a party that is represented. If one is in a minority in the > party, one can easily end up inaccurately represented. A totally > different possibility has been suggested from time to time, but it > has never, to my knowledge, been used in political elections. It's > standard practice with corporations, in theory, though it is in > practice corrupted by certain power-centralizing practices which were > allowed to disrupte the democratic character of corporate elections, > and shareholders were not sufficiently organized, independently of > the corporations -- centralized power -- to resist this. > > Corporations generally allow proxy voting, so that those who actually > vote in corporate elections or other decisions made at regular > meetings of the shareholders are casting votes not only for their own > shares (if they have any, there are professional proxies who do this > representation), but for those who have voluntarily chosen them as > representatives. > > Attempts have been made to apply this to public elections. I forget > the city, but there was a proposal in the early 20th century to hold > an election for a City Council where, in the council, representatives > would exercise the votes they recieved in the general election. This > would have been, for the first time, true and accurate representation > before the Council. Because some council members would have many more > votes than others, others would have less; this would produce a more > representative result than a scheme in which votes are allocated to > seats equally, because smaller groups could still obtain seats. > (Assume a fixed number of seats. Suppose the top N vote-getters are > elected in a vote-for-one election. Look at the minimum number of > votes obtained by a candidate who nevertheless obtained a seat. In a > system which redistributes votes somehow so that a faction with 2Q > votes gets two seats, and Q votes are required to win a seat, and > there are N seats, compared to one where the top N candidates get > seats, with variable voting power, it's obvious that since for some > seats in the latter case, more than Q votes were obtained, some must > have less, and thus smaller factions get representation.) > > Arguments against systems like this, on the face, seem to be based on > the idea that it would assign too much power to individuals, though > the power of an indivicual councilmember would probably be less than > that of, say, a single elected mayor; I would more precisely claim > that opposition is based, in the end, on distrust of democracy. > > Fortunately, a relatively simple system, rooted in early study of > Single Transferable Vote by Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), > published in 1884 or so, allows the creation of a peer assembly, > where all seats represent exactly the same number of voters. Dodgson > recognized a basis fact of electoral democracy, one which actually > underlies the power of Plurality Voting and explains why, in spite of > its obvious deficiencies, it has remained: most voters have > sufficient information to be clear about their Favorite, but may have > much less information about lower preferences. Thus preferential > ballot, so easily seen as obviously superior, may be collecting > noise, unless special importance is given to the first preference. > And where that preference is not strong, this, too, may be quite > noisy. Dodgson harness the power of first preference, to create > accurate proportional representation that did not effectively > disenfranchise those who only voted for one candidate (when that > candidate did not win). He hit upon the idea of what Warren Smith > later called Asset Voting; it was earlier known as Candidate Proxy > when proposed by Mike Ossipoff and Forest Simmons in the late 1990s. > In an STV election, let the candidate in first position on any > otherwise exhausted ballot recast the vote. > > Dodgson's proposal was lost in the noise for a long time, even though > he's been considered one of the foremost experts on voting systems of > the nineteenth century. The implications and possibilities are > enormous, from such a simple tweak. > > A long time ago, the United States was founded on rhetoric about "No > Taxation without Representation." But I have personally never been > represented by anyone I chose, nor, even, by the somewhat lesser > standard of being represented by someone who was chosen by someone I > chose. In direct democracy (i.e., New England Town Meeting > government), I can vote directly on many issues. But as the scale has > increased, this ability is almost always lost, for reasons that are > obvious and that are not addressed merely by devices such as internat > voting. Deliberation by representation is essential when the scale > becomes large. > > And no voting system that massively anonymizes the process can > actually create this, no matter how idea the system seems on pater as > to "social utility" or various measures of representational quality. > What Asset Voting would do is to create a set of "electors" who then > *publicly* elect an assembly to actually conduct legislative > business, which could include the election of public officers, which > can then use the highly effective deliberative processes, not > depending only on limited single-ballot procedures or even restricted > ballot (i.e., top-two runoff, as an example). > > I would know where my vote went, exactly, I would know if it was used > a part of the election quota, or perhaps was wasted, and if it was > wasted, in general, I'd know that the candidate I trusted might be > responsible. I've recommended the Hare quota, i.e., a fixed quota > designed to set a maximum number of seats, not to necessarily elect a > fixed number. I.e., if candidates holding the dregs cannot find > compromises, they and those they represent lose representation, until > and unless they do compromise. If Assembly rules require, at least > for some purposes, an absolute majority of the theoretical maximum, > there is no gain in power by refusing to compromise, there is, > instead, a small loss. > > Under these conditions an absolute majority of the Assembly would, > with absolute free choice in representation, represent a majority of > the electorate. I know of no other proposed system of proportional > representation (other than variations such as the early 20th century > variable voting scheme described above) that can accomplish this. > > Because the electors are public voters, who have assigned their votes > in a public process, it also becomes possible to separate > deliberation and aggregation. I do not know how much difference this > would actually make, given how freely seats would be elected, but if > electors are allowed to vote directly on any issue before the > assembly (other than Questions of Privilege, another matter), the > seats can be seen, then, as representatives in deliberation and only, > in aggregation, as "default voters." The process would work fine if > no electors vote directly, but it means that the dregs, the votes not > used to elect a seat, would not be wasted, they could still be > exercised, if the electors took the trouble. It means that an elector > might more readily make a compromise based on general usefulness in > deliberation, even if the elector fears that he or she will disagree > with the choice on some issue. An elector holding a lot of votes > might have some significant impact, if the vote was close in the Assembly. > > Asset Voting could create a penumbra of electors who serve as > intermediaries between anonymous voters and elected seats. Electors > are directly chosen, presumably with little or no restriction. I > could choose someone with whom I can actually sit down and talk. My > elector will generally be known as someone with influence over the > seat, because the votes are explicitly known. Asset Voting would > connect me with the Assembly. To get something to the floor of the > Assembly, I'd only need to convince my elector that it's worthwhile, > and then the elector must convince the holder of the seat. Yet > general noise, bad ideas, etc., would tend to be filtered out, but > not with simple rejection and igorance, as happens at present. My Bad > Idea would be rejected, hopefully, by a specific person, either my > elector, or, at the next step, my elected seat. Who can explain it, > through the elector. Someone I trust, in general. If it actually goes > before the Assembly, then I know that it has a shot at being > considered by a wider group. If for some reason, my elector and seat > aren't willing to consider it, I can find anyone else with a > different elector, and the idea has a shot. > > For very popular electors, the scale would be too large, and I'd > expect the system to adjust toward smaller and smaller vote counts > for electors, with, possibly, intermediate aggregations, more or less > along the lines of delegable proxy. But delegable proxy could be > totally informal, advisory, which is pretty much how I've proposed it > everywhere. It's just a way of communicating in large-scale > organizations, that can also help with very small-scale organizations. > > So I'm not terribly interested in methods of aggregating > representation through theoretical optimization from a single ballot. > They seems like utterly impoverished approaches to me, that would not > result in true, clear representation. The social intelligence of a > single ballot is very, very limited, given that alternatives not only > exist, they are routine in small-scale direct democracy and in > certain large-scale applications. Proxy voting is considered > inappropriate in membership organizations, by Robert's Rules of > Order, for reasons that I won't go into here, but RRONR was > contemplating only direct democracy, as practiced and implemented for > centuries, and, I'd suggest, the arguments against proxy voting were > shallow, mostly based on the idea that property rights are not > represented; they are quite in favor of proxy voting with respect to > property rights. > > But ... what if the members of an organization are encouraged to > think of the organization as "theirs" in some way? What if the > property right analogy is more applicable than was thought, what if > this would encourage a deeper sense of participation and "ownership"? > If I invest a thousand hours of volunteer time in an organization, > how is this different from investing thousands of dollars in some > piece of property. The difference I see is that in the organization, > generally a nonprofit, I don't gain "personal ownership." But there > are other kinds of ownership, including collective pride and a sense > of responsibility. > > However, Asset Voting only represents narrow representation by what > resembles proxy voting, in the process of electing an assembly. I > raise the ownership issue because, indeed, I believe that our > societies will function better if citizens feel "ownership." I've > seen it in small New England Town Meeting towns. Citizens have the > sense that it is "their town" and "their town government." They take > responsibility for the town and for each other. What if we could > foster this on a large scale? Wouldn't that be interesting? > > The biggest opposition to Asset Voting, once the power of it is > realized, would be from political parties and those who benefit from > the divisions that political parties represent. Parties must > amalgamate issues to be efficient, so minority representation gets > lost; if you are, as an example, a Pro-Life Progressive (they > exist!), you are out of luck. Even though, in theory, if you are > truly pro-life you would also be against war and the corporate rape > of the planet (from this point of view). Asset makes political > parties much less important, I'd expect, because it's people being > elected, not parties or issues, even though these people may have > their own political affiliations and issues they consider important. > They would not need to affiliate with a party to gain voting power as > electors, and because the electors are a reduced set of voters, they > might be readily elected based on personal communication within the > elector body with no need at all for public campaigning, which > requires major expense. > > Address campaign finance reform by making it unnecessary! Tell me, > what would you think of someone who tried to persuade you to vote for > them instead of a person you already trust, by spending a lot of > money? Would you be inclinded to trust this person? I wouldn't! The > very fact of campaign spending, in an Asset environment, would mean > that the person has some axe to grind, some cause to advocate, a > cause that can collect money, and the most obvious candidates would > also be major sources of corruption, who, instead of relying upon > cogent argument and relationships of personal trust, want to > influence large numbers through media manipulation. > > I don't think this is a difficult argument to fathom! The fact is > that most voters do *not* trust politicians, it's a profession that > is down somewhere below "user car salesman." They don't trust them > because they know that the system requires politicians to lie in > order to gain enough votes to win election, and that politicians must > also gain campaign funding, which is most easily gathered through > large donations from special interests of various kinds. Voters > nevertheless vote for these politicians, whom they do not trust, > because they don't have any other better choice that wouldn't waste > their vote. And many don't vote at all, because they have no > confidence that their vote would make any difference at all. > > Asset Voting causes every vote to count, to make a difference. In the > systems I'd propose, if you don't trust *anyone* (a bad condition to > be in!), you can register as a candidate for a nominal fee and vote > for yourself, and then participate directly in subsequent process. > But most people would not bother with that, too much work for too > little benefit, if one only gets one vote. (It might be necessary to > get two or three or more, and registered candidates might be required > to cast a separate identified preferential ballot when they register; > the "two or three" might be necessary for security reasons. Details. > If they get less than the minimum number, then, in the actual secret > ballot process their vote would be reassigned to a candidate from > their preferential ballot and the official results would only show > that the candidate got less than the minumum, it would otherwise be > anonymized. Under this scheme, candidates would not vote in the > general election directly, they would vote by identified ballot.) > -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf Voters Have Reason to Worry http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf Checking election outcome accuracy http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
