Hello,
Warren Smith wrote:
For example, consider a 2-way election Gandhi vs Hitler in which
everybody votes
for the (unanimously agreed to be) worst choice: Hitler.
Well, that is a "Nash equilibrium" because no single voter can change
the election result!
Indeed, essentially every possible vote pattern in every possible
large election, is a Nash equilibrium.
If the election-method is proxy-voting, then a Nash equilibrium seems to
not exist. Because you can then vote for a voter of Hitler. This in
itself is already a payoff (because Hitler gets less direct votes). But
even further it's possible to vote for a voter of Hitler who says
something like: I delegate all my votes to Hitler until I have 50% of
all votes, then I delegate them to Gandhi.
What do you think?
Thomas
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