> Warren Smith wrote: >> ... I think you are pretty much right... But I think there is a >> deeper truth.... First of all, as I said in the ESF thread quoting >> Selten, it is interesting to consider the consequences of >> maximally-rational behavior, even if humans aren't it. Second, >> there is the also-interesting issue of what humans actually do. And >> hopefully there is some relation between them. > > Precisely that hope is without foundation. There can be no useful > relation between a model that assumes a maximum of purposive > rationality and a reality that demonstrates none. No voter ever > attempts to improve her standing in the electoral "game", because no > single vote ever affects the outcome of a typical election.
---ok, now you are going too far. "None"? Sorry, that is nonsense. And, you may not have noticed what I said re humans were designed by Darwin for smaller group sizes, e.g. tribes of a few 100 members, and their notions of "rational" are designed for groups of those sizes. I think a lot of behavior about sizes larger than that (such as a country-wide election) can be understood roughly, by saying "humans do stuff that'd be rational if it were size<300. The human inbuilt pseudo-rationality device basically can only count up to 200 and all populations>200 are treated by it as 200." Mind you, this is just my speculation. Can anybody see a way to prove it? I can't. > > Nash's model may still be useful for analyzing current voting methods, > as you suggest, but I believe those methods are (in a deeper sense) > wrong. In this sense, it is not the voter's behaviour that is > irrational, but rather our electoral practices. (more below) > > Jameson Quinn wrote: >> I agree with your premises, but not your conclusions. Voters are not >> purposive-rational, it's true. But that doesn't invalidate the >> conclusions of a Nash analysis, it just makes them tentative. Voters >> DO think of themselves as being purposive, even when they clearly >> aren't... > > I'm not so sure. Imagine a voter saying: "It's a good thing I voted > today, or the other side would have won the election!" > >> > More generally (I argue) purposive-rational models of ego-centric >> > behaviour are unlikely to be made serviceable for voting theory... > > Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: >> Whether or not that is the case for individual voters, one could >> still use purposive-rational models for political parties. This >> would be useful in considering what sort of "how to vote" >> instructions a party might provide to their voters in order to >> strategize on a wide scale... > > Right. When it comes to elections, a party is naturally self-seeking > and goal-oriented. If we model the party as a human player, it > definitely "wants" to win. Usually it also has the means of affecting > the outcome. > > But I think that individual voters must also have a place in any > overall theory of voting. Consider two facts (a,c) that such a theory > (b) must explain: > > a) The institutional fact of current electoral practices, > procedures, voting methods, and so forth. > > b) Theory to explain the rationality of both (a) and (c), and how > they interrelate. Why do we have *these* particular electoral > practices? Why does the voter participate in them? > > c) The behavioural fact of the individual's voting to no selfish > end, in pursuit of no personal interest. > > Both (a) and (c) are facts of considerable weight and relevance. If > (b) is to be useful as a theory, then we might expect it to explain > both. Warren and Raph suggested the Nash model (for sake of a), but > it is contradicted by (c). You suggest retargetting the model such > that individual parties (not voters) are the players in the electoral > game. This may be valid as far as it goes, but it still leaves (c) > unexplained. > > Maybe no single theory can explain both facts? The only way forward, > then, would be to reject one of the facts as being (in some sense) > wrong. If we accept (a) current practice and (b) the body of mostly > purposive-rational theory that informs it, then a question mark is > left hanging over the individual votes. Every vote cast in a mass > election is difficult to explain, and apparently irrational. > > On the other hand, if we accept (c) voting for non-instrumental and > social reasons in the light of (b) a theory that can explain such > forms of rationality (Habermas for example), then doubt shifts to our > current electoral practices. Something in our elections or voting > methods is wrong, or something is missing, because from the > perspective of the socially motivated voter, they are extremely > anti-social. > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 > http://zelea.com/ > -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info