OK, thanks. Please go on to propose the condorcet, if you think it is the best.
Approval voting was used in the French presidential election, first round, where far-right nationalist Le Pen got to the second round. Le Pen was hardly a centrist. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting#Effect_on_elections Quote:"one study [16] showed that approval voting would not have chosen the same two winners as plurality voting (Chirac and Le Pen) in France's presidential election of 2002 (first round) - it instead would have chosen Chirac and Jospin. To some, this seemed a more reasonable result[citation needed] since Le Pen was a radical who lost to Chirac by an enormous margin in the second round." Peter On 4/28/10, robert bristow-johnson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Apr 28, 2010, at 2:19 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: > > Condorcet methods have not been used in politics yet, I think. >> > > Condorcet has not yet been used in a *government* general election. that > does not mean it hasn't been used in politics. it has been used in > organization elections for a single winner. i might consider the Czech > Green Party to be an "organization". you can choose to use whatever method > you like without having to get a law passed as you would in a general > election. > > Are there by any chance other methods to elect centrist presidents? >> > > Condorcet *does* tend to favor centrist candidates because Condorcet makes > good use of 2nd-choice rankings and people on the two extreme wings are > likely to choose the centrist for their 2nd choice over the extremist on the > other side. > > but that is not a good reason to use Condorcet. there are many reasons to > use Condorcet but the main reason is simply majority rule: > > If a majority of voters agree that Candidate A > is a better choice than Candidate B, then > Candidate B should not be elected. > > that's really it. that's why Condorcet is the correct method over IRV-STV, > Plurality, Borda, Bucklin, Range, Approval or whatever else they come up > with. it's simple, transparent, and directly compatible with the goals of > majority rule. > > despite Kathy Dopp's knee-jerk reaction against STV, it probably remains to > be the simplest fair method to get proportional representation for the > multi-winner Council seats. IRV proponents like to extend STV to > single-winner, but it's pretty well established that it's inferior to > Condorcet. sometimes they elect the same winner and sometimes they don't. > the problem is when IRV fails to elect the Condorcet winner - when that > happens, a majority of voters agreed that Candidate A is a better choice > than Candidate B, yet Candidate B was elected. > > -- > > r b-j [email protected] > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > > > > >
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