> Jonathan Lundell wrote: > > On May 1, 2010, at 2:15 AM, Markus Schulze wrote: > > VoteFair representation ranking is described > > in chapter 15 of this book: > > > > http://www.solutionscreative.com/download/EndingHiddenUnfairnessInElections_ OntarioVersion.pdf
> The book also claims that the underlying single-winner method > (based on pairwise comparisons) is strategy-free. As far as I know, the only strategy that could possibly work with the Condorcet-Kemeny method is to try to create a situation that has circular ambiguity. This is very difficult to do in a way that is also likely to produce a specific outcome. (As a simplified explanation of circular ambiguity, it is a situation that does not have a Condorcet winner. In another message I described a way to think of circular ambiguity.) If the situation already involves circular ambiguity, it would be difficult for a small number of voters to figure out how to control the outcome. (A large number of voters already have lots of influence.) Keep in mind that I recommend the Condorcet-Kemeny method to identify the most popular candidate. I do not recommend that the second-most popular candidate be elected to a second seat. That would be vulnerable to strategic voting. For this reason I recommend VoteFair representation ranking to fill a second seat (and additional seats). It protects against excessive influence through strategic voting. Richard Fobes ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
