Dear Richard Fobes, you wrote (4 May 2010):
> The Condorcet-Kemeny method has significant advantages over > the Condorcet-Schulze method, but some of those advantages > have not yet been recognized. > > Some of the advantages involve not-yet named criteria. For > example, reversal symmetry just requires that the winner not > be the winner if all the ballot preferences are reversed, > and both Condorcet-Kemeny and Condorcet-Schulze meet that > criteria. A not-yet named criteria beyond that, which I > would call "full reversal symmetry," would require a > complete symmetrical reversal of popularity ranking if all > the ballot preferences are symmetrically reversed, and > Condorcet-Kemeny meets that criteria, but Condorcet-Schulze > does not. Also the Schulze method satisfies this criterion. Markus Schulze ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
