Jameson Quinn wrote:
Condorcet winner is M. But if all the RC>M voters truncate before M, then M does not beat R and L, so there's two cycles M>RC>R,L>M. Most Condorcet tiebreakers, including Schulze and Minimax, would name RC as the winner. (Of course, if the M voters retaliate in kind, then R or L would win Condorcet, or M would win Approval, Range, or Bucklin.)
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There are two ways I can see to avoid this dilemma. One is LNH-type elimination, such as in IRV or certain versions of Asset. Since RC is eliminated before M, no lower votes of the RC voters can help RC win.
Would DH3-resistant Condorcet methods like Smith,IRV or BTR-IRV also resist the truncation strategy?
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