I see deciding to use Condorcet as important. To go with that we
would need to decide how to resolve cycles.
On May 13, 2010, at 3:37 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Robert,
--- En date de : Mer 12.5.10, robert bristow-johnson <[email protected]
> a écrit :
On May 12, 2010, at 7:40 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I think approval-completed Condorcet is a better
proposal because there's
a greater chance people would understand how it
works.
what exactly is that? the winner being the candidate
in the Smith set with the most 1st-choice votes?
My preference is that when there is no CW, the candidate with the most
votes in any position is elected. But you could limit it to the Smith
or Schwartz set.
Any Condorcet method means the voters doing ranking of candidates and
the counters identifying the CW if there is one.
If no CW the counters find a cycle of candidates and the particular
method decides which cycle member shall win (some methods use most
votes as mentioned above; some use margins - difference in liking of a
pair; more vs less).
Either way, each member of a cycle would be CW if the other cycle
members were omitted.
While quality of resolving a cycle is important, an important detail
of that is being able to describe to voters meaningfully what is being
done to/for them.
Kevin Venzke
Backers of other methods can claim theirs are better than Condorcet.
Consider what Condorcet offers as to ease of voting for the one OR
MORE candidates you like best, including indicating liked a little vs
more liked - and ease of counting such votes
I read of arranging ballot data in a triangle, rather than in a matrix
as usually described. A minor detail, but what would be easiest for
ballot counters is most important while they count, though rearranging
for later processing would be possible.
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