At 08:50 PM 5/17/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Lun 17.5.10, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax <[email protected]> a écrit :
> Here is the issue. Is the "pairwise contest" some *other
> election*, where the two candidates face off against each
> other? But this is a completely different election! It's a
> theoretical construct, not an actual procedure to follow
> with ballots.
Are you asking me or are you arguing that multiple definitions are
possible? I don't dispute the latter.
It was a rhetorical question. Then I gave a point
to be considered. You can still make different
definitions, as long as it is understood what this means.
If you're asking me, the answer is that "pairwise contest" has nothing
to do with two elections, and only applies to rankings or things that
can be interpreted as rankings. (That's a definition, not an attempt to
justify the concept.)
In other words, there is a "virtual pairwise
contest" in which vote-for-one full votes are
cast, based on preferences shown in the original
ballots. Just so it's understood that in a *real*
pairwise contest, the same results might well not
be obtained, and especially if it is a real
contest that is, say, a runoff election between
the Condorcet winner and the other candidate.
It's been said that Condorcet methods are
"instant round robin." The interpretation being
proposed above, however, causes the voters in
this virtual election to vote *differently* than
they voted in the original election. In the
"instant round robin" virtual election, their
votes are what is called, when cast in the
original Range election, "exaggerated votes," and
voters who vote this way are often denigrated as "selfish."
You go on to argue that "pairwise contest" may not be a very relevant
idea. That's a reasonable argument. I don't want to change my definitions
as I change my opinions though. If necessary I'd rather coin new terms.
I've used pairwise contest to mean the same
thing, Kevin, I'm just pointing out that the
concept was a bit fuzzy, and that Smith is quite
likely correct: Condorcet himself might have
agreed that Range satisfies the criterion named
after him, there is some evidence for that.
The pure preferential interpretation, to be sure,
still has a utility. My own view is that almost
always this Condorcet winner is the best choice,
but when the exceptions involve choosing,
instead, a Range winner, there are two
possibilities: the Range winner actually does
have higher social utility, which argues for
choosing this one, or the Range votes are somehow
distorted, with two reasonably possible sources:
normalization error (where a voter votes full
strength no matter what the absolute preference
strength might be), and poor assessment of the
strategic situation, i.e., the identity of the
frontrunners. A good method would consider these
errors as possible, and, when needed, test them with a runoff.
Unless experience shows that an actual error in
the result, as defined by the primary method, is
so low in probability or in magnitude that it is
not worth the trouble. To know the truth about
this, in real elections, will require collecting
real range data in elections, and real experience
in runoffs. Simulations can be valuable, but real
data overrules theory; the problem is, generally,
that we don't have real data. I'm pointing out
that Bucklin using a Range ballot to drive the
"voting machine" would very likely collect real data.
It's clear, though, that the assumption that the
Condorcet winner is the best winner is based on a
set of assumptions about how voting works that
don't necessarily correspond to reality. Almost
nobody disagrees that, with commensurable
utilities, sincerely disclosed, the Range winner
would be best, so the question boils down to
whether or not *actually disclosed utilities*
will provide any usable preference strength
information, sufficiently related to true
commensurable utilities to improve results.
The concept of a majority preference being
overridden by a stronger preference of a minority
is tricky. In small groups, it is very clear that
social choices get made this way, within limits.
Small groups don't choose a common pizza by
straight numbers, not without looking for a more
widely-acceptable choice. Not if they are
functional, anyway! Same with restaurants for a
group to dine at. The norm isn't the choice with
the most group members having it as favorite, but
generally the one with the least number of
serious objections. In the FairVote restaurant
choice election, recently discussed by them, the
kicker, hardly mentioned by them, is that the
choice wasn't objected to, there was a defacto
"acceptance vote." And since the voters accepted
a choice that they had voted as if it was awful,
clearly their votes were distorted, and clearly
their *real* intention was not to "win," but to
have a nice lunch that all could enjoy. And,
apparently, they enjoyed it. And if they hadn't, they'd have been fired.
Well, I don't know that the last is true, and
probably it wasn't but .... this is the problem
with conducting test elections like this with
your boss or "leader" being one of the voters and
a bit "involved" with the idea that one of the
methods is the best. I don't recall. How did they
decide which result to accept?
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
