Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Lun 14.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[email protected]> a
écrit :
> That's a point. Let's say that this means that Majority can
> only work when a majority ranks a single candidate top. Then
> I think Approval will satisfy that variant of Majority, as
> well; if a majority approves only of a single candidate,
> that candidate will win, even if the minority approves of
> everybody but that candidate. The reasoning would then be:
> if a majority approves of more than one candidate, Majority
> doesn't come into play, as there's no majority with a strict
> preference.
>
> In other words, Approval would be a system where your
> ballots are limited to ballots of the sort:
>
> A > B = C
> A = B > C
> A = B = C
>
> It would "work", but it's a big hack and definitely doesn't
> meet universal domain - thus you could argue that the
> situation weakens the Majority criterion, making it easier
> to pass.
I don't see any need to interpret Approval as failing universal domain
to make this work. It works exactly like FPP: There are lower preferences
assumed to exist, but they aren't collected.
Kevin
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