They ask for feedback and thank Warren Smith and Forest Simmons of this list in acknowledgments section. I like that they begin the paper with a statement noticing the false sales pitches of those supporting IRV method of counting ballots, and end by noting that approval voting satisfies the criteria they examine, which they seem to examine in a logical, understandable fashion (I don't have time to study the paper in detail now, but it seems very readable):
"Nonetheless, many people defend various voting reform proposals (e.g. Instant Runo Voting) by claiming that their proposal will solve the \lesser of two evils" problem, and allow voters to support their sincere favorite candidate [3, 4]. It is easy to show that this claim is false for Instant Runo Voting, as there will still be cases in which voters have an incentive to insincerely rank a \lesser evil" in rst place. Still, the claims are common, suggesting that there is public interest in the design of voting methods that elim- inate the incentive to list a \lesser evil" in rst place." ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: <[email protected]> Date: Tue, Aug 24, 2010 at 8:23 AM Subject: [POLMETH] Notice of Paper Posting to Political Methodology To: [email protected] A new document has been added to the Society for Political Methodology Website. Title: Geometric construction of voting methods that protect voters' first choices Author(s): Alex Small Entry Date: 2010-08-23 Keyword(s): Geometry, Strategy, Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, Election Methods, Ranked Voting Abstract: We consider the possibility of designing an election method that eliminates the incentives for a voter to rank any other candidate equal to or ahead of his or her sincere favorite. We refer to these methods as satisfying the ``Strong Favorite Betrayal Criterion" (SFBC). Methods satisfying our strategic criteria can be classified into four categories, according to their geometrical properties. We prove that two categories of methods are highly restricted and closely related to positional methods (point systems) that give equal points to a voter's first and second choices. The third category is tightly restricted, but if criteria are relaxed slightly a variety of interesting methods can be identified. Finally, we show that methods in the fourth category are largely irrelevant to public elections. Interestingly, most of these methods for satisfying the SFBC do so only ``weakly," in that these methods make no meaningful distinction between the first and second ! place on the ballot. However, when we relax our conditions and allow (but do not require) equal rankings for first place, a wider range of voting methods are possible, and these methods do indeed make meaningful distinctions between first and second place. http://polmeth.wustl.edu/mediaDetail.php?docId=1247 ********************************************************** Political Methodology E-Mail List Editors: Diana O'Brien <[email protected]> Jon C. Rogowski <[email protected]> ********************************************************** Send messages to [email protected] To join the list, cancel your subscription, or modify your subscription settings visit: http://polmeth.wustl.edu/polmeth.php ********************************************************** -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
