2010/8/27 robert bristow-johnson <[email protected]> > > On Aug 27, 2010, at 2:29 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > Bucklin, too. >> > > Bucklin uses the same ranked-choice ballot that Condorcet or IRV or Borda > uses (ignoring that some allow for equal ratings), so it can be compared > directly to any. and if we assume that the highest rank vote is the same as > the "single affirmative vote" of FPTP, it can be compared to that. > > my position is that sometimes these methods elect the Condorcet winner and > sometimes they do not. i would say that at least one pathology exists when > they elect someone different than the Condorcet winner. > > > > >> It is reasonable, in the face of such massive and frequently-arising >> >> evidence that IRV has (obvious) problems, to promote it, as opposed to >> >> some simpler method largely free of such problems? >> > >> > >> > is the some simpler method either Approval or Score Voting? >> > >> > what simpler method are you suggesting, Warren? >> > > > > 2010/8/27 Warren Smith <[email protected]> >> --score & approval are simpler and are comparatively free of crazy >> pathologies. >> > > i started engaging Clay Shentrup about this, but i really felt "piled upon" > at his ESF group (i quickly unsubscribed) and that they were not listening > at all. but this main thesis you're selling, Warren, needs discussion and > defending. and it should be here rather than at ESF, which really should be > renamed the Score Voting Advocacy Forum. > > i will say this again; both Score (or Range) Voting and Approval Voting > have *inherent* strategic (or "tactical", i really don't know which word is > best used, i *do* know the difference in a military context) burdens for the > voter. because, as i examine my own feelings about voting, and as i talk > with other voters about election systems (because of IRV and a credible > third party, there is a lot of discussion about it here in Vermont), both > Score and Approval will degenerate to Plurality for voters that just do not > wish to harm their favorite candidate. and, in talking with people and > examining my own motivations, i really believe that this is most voters. if > the large majority of voters score their fav with 99 and everyone else gets > 0 (and the equivalent with approval), how is that any different than a > scaled outcome of FPTP? these methods will differ from FPTP (which i *know* > sucks) only to the degree that people will forsake their favorite, at least > a little. >
But people are already forsaking their favorite in FPTP, by strategically voting for the lesser-evil frontrunner. Presumably, such people would at least also vote top-score for all candidates better than that frontrunner. This fact would, in turn, change the frontrunner dynamics, favoring candidate quality instead of money for becoming a perceived frontrunner. There are still several possible pathologies (including current third-party voters who might bullet vote for the wrong reasons), but this situation would still be markedly superior to the status quo. > > and, in the Chittenden State Senate district in Vermont, we *virtually* > have Approval (vote for up to 6; top 6 vote-getters are seated) and i can > tell you first hand that nearly *everyone* that is politically savvy at all > bullet vote for one or maybe two candidates. and the vote totals (that are > about 1/4 of the maximum) bear that out. we actually *worry* about if > voting for someone we would rather see elected over the jerks in the other > party will actually harm our favorite candidate. i haven't met a single > person who told me they used all 6 of their votes. > Multi-candidate, low-profile elections are a different kettle of fish. > > with Score and Approval, it's easy to mark your favorite candidate > (Score=99 or Approval=1). and we know that Satan gets Score=0 or > Approval=0. then what do you do with other candidates that you might think > are better than Satan? that question has never been answered by Clay. and > any answer must be of a strategic nature. > I agree with you here, but think that the strategic equilibrium with real human voters would still be superior to plurality, as I explained above. JQ
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