Kathy Dopp wrote:
Markus,
Unfortunately I don't have time to study it now, but a quick perusal
makes it seem written in a clear, easily-understood style of writing.
Am I to assume that this method solves the problem of irrelevant
alternatives (the spoiler problem) in all cases unlike both plurality
and IRV?
I do not know what "clone-independent" means (perhaps I should by now).
No rank ballot system can meet IIA while electing an unanimous preferred
candidate and having no dictator. (That doesn't mean Schulze is as bad
as IRV, though, only that "perfection" cannot be attained.)
Clone-independence means that if one adds or removes candidates from a
set that all voters vote next to each other (but not necessarily in the
same order), that shouldn't cause someone in the set to lose if someone
in the set won before the modification, and nor should it cause someone
in the set to win if a candidate outside the set won before the
modification. Intuitively, it means that a party shouldn't lose (or win)
merely by splitting.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
