At 12:30 AM 11/17/2010, Jan Kok wrote:
On Tue, Nov 16, 2010 at 8:33 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
<[email protected]> wrote:
>> - If you vote for someone who gets more than the quota, then the
>> excess votes get passed on to help elect other candidates. So who did
>> you elect? Who is your representative?
>
> You elected your representative, the one you voted for, or the one your
> representative voted for. The contingency that your
representative votes for
> more than one exists, but can be handled. I think it will probably be rare.
> If I have N votes to assign, I can gain maximum access to one whom I choose
> and give all my votes to, than by distributing them. I then distribute my
> influence, diluting it and making it less significant.
Suppose I as an elector have .4 of quota and am forced to give away my
assets and drop out. And suppose there are two candidates C and D that
I'm happy with who each have .8 of quota. I could give all my assets
to C and let him distribute the excess to whoever he wants (which
might not be D). Or I could split my assets and push both C and D over
the top.
Yes, you can do either. Both are rational under some circumstances.
If you value the two candidates equally, if you have difficulty
deciding which you favor, you could indeed give half your votes to
one and half to the other. However, if you do this, you will have
less obvious influence. That is, the "problem" that you create for
your constituent you also create for yourself. If you give all your
votes to one, all three know that there is a specific representative
elected through the vote (and, in addition, 0.2 quota given to
another). This is more likely to maximize your ability, and your
client's ability through you, to access the assembly, not so much
through threat of withholding your vote, but through the ability to
be heard. If there is a seat who got 0.4 quota from you, it would be
collossally stupid to not listen to you! What this would do is to
spread the deliberative process through a broader number of virtual
representatives who filter communication, so that the assembly is not
overloaded, and individual voters know who to talk to if they have concerns.
For me, this is a type of FA/DP application.
In the contingency of the elector splitting the vote, the voter still
knows what power was exerted by the vote. It's measureable. If the
two seats vote identically on an issue of concern to the voter, the
effect is the same as if the votes had been given to one. However, if
they vote differently, it is, for that issue, almmost as if the vote
were wasted. However, note: this is a conservative effect, indicating
a lack of assembly consensus, those two votes count for quorum, but
tend to suppress the passage of the related issue by a majority. To
the extent that this is widespread among seats, it will encourage
further negotiation in the assembly.
To top this off, consider the contingency that the seats vote
differently. Suppose that this is open asset, i.e., the electors may
stil cast votes, perhaps remotely, on non-privileged questions before
the Assembly. The elector may still vote, if this is a matter of
concern for the elector. The elector is the true representative of
the voter, and electors simply choose who will represent them in the
assembly, primarily for purposes of access to the motion and debate
process. Actual decision-making right is reserved to the electors,
but they may routinely delegate this, and the system, as I'd have it,
assumes that delegation with the vote assignments.
Wouldn't you rather have TWO "representatives"?
Maybe. More often, no. Two is less than one. That is, if one, I have
a full vote of "access." With two, I have a ha;f-vote of access. The
problem is that the benefit of access is inversely exponential to the
vote strength. It's easy to see at the extremes.
If they are not busy, a legislator will listen to and discuss issues
with a single voter, representing nobody but himself or herself. More
often, they have staff to listen to concerns. If consitutents
actually try to, in numbers, discuss an issue with an elected
representative, they will find themselves, often, frustrated. Asset
voting would help to resolve this well-known problem of scale in
democracy, and it is a benefit to both sides of this, the top level
and the bottom level.
My point is that in any PR system, I don't think it makes sense to say
that you have exactly _one_, specific "representative". And I don't
think it matters.
First of all, "exactly" is quite an exaggeration of what I wrote. I'd
say, instead, that there is a benefit to knowing "substantially" who
was elected, but that benefit will not always be realized. Just
usually and substantially. Regardless, in *any case*, the voter can
tell what the effect of the vote was, precisely, i.e., it was a part
of the quota of X, or it was divided between X and Y, or, quite
rarely I'd think, between more than that. Every vote counts. This is
not true for any other proportional representation system that I've
seen. (But Asset is a tweak on voting systems like STV-PR, fixing the
basic problem of STV-PR that Carroll saw, so far back.)
What I think is important is being able to get your ideas put in front
of the legislature. You want access to whichever legislators might be
friendly to your ideas. With Asset Voting, as you point out, your best
bet is to go through your elector, who can send your idea up through
the lattice of electors to an elected representative.
Bingo. And the elected representatives do know where they got their
votes. In the example described, if a single choice is made, allowing
the seat extra votes to distribute -- it's a simple option, and one
simply gives all the votes to the most trusted possibility -- you
have created, by voting for the elector, increased access for
yourself. That might go through a chain, but each link in the chain
gathers strength. Long chain, you have the advantage of someone who
is probably very accessible to you at the bottom. Short chain, you
have more direct access, but more risk of being unable to access the
first link.
Voters will adjust how they vote according to what works best for
them. The basic principle, though, is simple: vote for the person you
want to be your connection to the Assembly. Vote for someone
inaccessible, you've shot yourself in the foot. You may think this
person is the Messiah, fine. But if you want to be able to talk to
the Messiah, perhaps to ask questions! -- wouldn't you? -- you may
need an intercessor if this Messiah is human.
Now, suppose you give all your 0.4 quota to one candidate with 0.8
already, electing that seat. You are like money in the bank for that
seat. I.e., the seat could lose 0.2 quota and retain the seat. The
seat gives the 0.2 quota to another seat. That is, there is now a
seat with special influence with another seat. You, as an elector
with highly visible and significant support, have access to your own
seat -- the one you voted for -- and influence through that seat with
another seat. That other seat will also know that your seat was able
to give that 0.2 vote to him or her because of your 0.4 quota vote transfer.
Your net gain is likely higher than if you split your vote. The
second seat would talk to you if you ask. You just don't choose directly.
You do have a third option, you know. You can talk to the one you are
contemplating giving the 0.4 quota to and ask to whom they will give
the vote. You can decide if this is acceptable to you, and make your
decision accordingly.
Asset is not simply a voting system, it sets up a deliberative
process. It is deliberative process that is the bedrock of democracy,
not voting, which is merely a test, determining readiness to make a
decision and making it when warranted.
Direct democracy is deprecated because it is impossible for the
general electorate to be adequately informed, most of the time.
Absentee voting is generally discouraged in assemblies because the
voter is not present with the debate. While proxy voting is
effectively what seats do when it comes to voting, the structure, as
I see it, encourages participation at all levels. You, as an elector,
if direct voting by electors is allowed -- and I see no reason to not
allow it, though it is, indeed, a radical reform -- decide if you are
sufficiently informed to vote intelligently or not. Given that you
can choose someone whom you most trust to vote for you, routinely, I
don't think that you will habitually vote directly. But if you have
enough votes, you might.
That is, electors form a penumbra of involved citizens, freely chosen
by the voters in the asset election, who may become involved in
assembly business, follow all the hearings they choose to follow,
become as informed as they can, and who can vote directly. They can
discuss their findings with their seat, if they have enough votes to
gain privileged access, or even if they only represent themselves. At
least the seat knows that they voted for him or her!
What the Asset election really does is to select, voluntarily, a full
citizen assembly. Anyone can join this by registering as an elector
candidate, and presumably they vote for themselves -- there is no
reason not to if you are willing to register -- so this is very close
to direct democracy, but with tweaks that avoid the dangers of mob
rule, that confer the benefits of representative democracy, necessary
because of the scale, without losing the benefits of voluntary
participation. If you have time, and are willing to risk reprisals,
you become an elector, you lose only your trivial registration fee.
If you are too poor to pay the fee, and can't get someone to pay it
for you, then probably you should, until the next election, focus in
improving your situation! You can still participate indirectly
through the elector you vote for.
So there could be an advantage for electors to distribute assets to
multiple candidates. If C doesn't like your idea, maybe D will.
But, if C gave the excess votes to D -- and if this is important to
you, you can be assured it will happen: "I will give you my 0.4 quota
if you will give the excess to D" -- then you have the benefit of
increased access to D as well -- the same 0.2 quota, as if you gave
it directly, if your conditional vote was open, but the effect would
be clear from the voting record anyway -- you have that same access.
As a high-level elector, with 0.4 quota, you could probably gain
privileged access to any seat, in fact, except for those who would
consider you repugnant! You are a huge part of the electoral body
that selects seats. You would be a political force, greater than most
present lobbyists. You could, if you decided to, deliver 40% of
what's needed to get elected. Legally!
Asset makes campaigning, my guess, obsolete. Rather, to get elected
to the assembly, become an elector, become active, be visible with
the work you do, and be accessible to your constituents or those who
might be or might become your constituents. Serve your public better
than others, listen to them, learn from them, and represent them. You
don't need money.
It is possible to have a voluntary poll tax, that would be
distributed to the electors according to the votes received. This
could be kept by electors for their own expenses and as for
compensation for what they do. (Beyond expenses, this would be
taxable income, I'd assume, like any other compensation for work
done, though it's possible that there would be an exempt amount, a
non-taxable floor.)
Electors could also collect contributions directly. I'd require this
to be disclosed, any amounts over a threshhold.
Details.
Bottom line: think about how the whole system would work. Thinking in
terms of present practice and necessities won't cut it. Asset really
is a radical reform.
What I'm promoting, first, is the use of Asset for organizational
elections. It's cheap, it's easy, and it is effective. It's a hybrid
between secret ballot and open election.
And if
D doesn't, maybe E or F (who I like but who were already elected by
the time I had to distribute my assets) would be interested.
Sure. What isn't necessary obvious to people at first is that the
seats aren't where the fundamental power is. The power is in the
electoral college, if it retains the right to vote directly. The
members of the electoral college use their voting power to ensure
that they have access when they need it to the assembly floor. They
have access proportionally, roughly, to their voting power.
But any seat can choose to listen to any elector.
The seats are only a way to filter assembly business to that approved
by the seats. To get a motion to the floor, you need the support of
two seats, one to make the motion and one to second it, and then you
need to be sure that the arguments necessary for passage (or
rejection, on the other side) are presented. My guess is that direct
voting would only be allowed on the main floor, not in commmitte.
Committees only make recommendations.
What I expect most people would want to do is to first try Asset
without the direct voting process. That may be good, but there is
also a risk. Direct voting reduces the power of the seats, in effect,
though my guess is that actual reversal of assembly decisions through
direct voting would be unusual. To change the process to allow direct
voting could require the assent of the seats, which involves them
voting against what may be their personal power. Don't be surprised
if it's difficult to change!
Still, if the electors, who are a limited group, decide, as a group,
to change the system, they have access to the power to do that. Next
election.... And if the voters think the electors are out to lunch,
there could be a massive shift the next Asset election.
A lot depends on the details. But for organizational elections, this
is so simple and so likely to create boards that truly represent the
members, that it is well worth trying.
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