Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
James Green-Armytage wrote:
So, the nomination results are a little less robust, but many of them
seem pretty intuitive. For example, it makes perfect sense to me that
plurality would be most vulnerable to strategic exit, and that minimax
would be minimally vulnerable to strategic nomination. It also makes
sense that Borda would be highly vulnerable to strategic entry (I give
some intuition for this in proposition 21), but I'm not as yet able to
give a good explanation for why Bucklin seems to be even more
vulnerable to strategic entry. Does anyone here want to try their hand
at that? I added Bucklin and Coombs to the paper at kind of the last
minute (September), so there's at least some possibility of a
programming glitch, but I've checked through several examples, and it
seems to be working properly, as far as I can tell.
Perhaps adding allied candidates in Bucklin delays the point at which
other candidates can get a majority. Say you have some friendly voters
who votes A first, as well as a bunch of other voters who may vote
another candidate B in any position. B wins. Then the friendly voters
turn A into A1, A2, A3, etc. On every ballot that votes A ahead of B,
this will push B further away so that the voters who do vote B ahead of
A don't get their contribution to B aligned with the A>B voters'
contribution to B until much later, at which point A might already have
won.
To be a little more precise, I mean that A1, A2, A3 etc. enter, as in
strategic nomination, and that all voters, not just the friendly ones,
rank them.
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