Forest Simmons wrote (31 Dec 2010):
Chris,
You are right that since Chain Climbing does not satisfy IPDA, neither
does the method that takes the
parwise victor of it and the Covering Chain winner. I was more
thinking out loud than pushing that idea.
Do you think that Approval Sorted Pairwise and the Covering Chain
process are simple enough for use in
a public proposal?
Happy New Year!
Forest
Forest,
Regarding your first paragraph above, the method you suggested before
was to elect whichever of the Chain
Climbing and Covering Chain winners was higher on the list L (made by
some method that meets mono-raise),
not whichever of the two pairwise beats the other; but I assume the same
applies.
In answer to your question, I'm afraid probably not. For a sceptical
electorate accustomed to essentially *no*
voting algorithm, I doubt that Approval-Sorted Margins by itself is
simple enough.
And yet it is nice to be able to do without the concept of the "Smith
set", necessary for "Smith//Approval".
Regarding Chain Covering, does the extra complexity of using ASM
instead of Approval to make the list L
really gain much?
Happy New Year to you too. :)
Chris Benham
The second method, the "covering chain" method, starts at the top of
the list
and works downward. A variable X is initialized as the alternative
highest on
the list. While some alternative covers X, the highest such
alternative on the
list becomes the new value of X. The final value of X is the covering
chain winner.
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