> > > The "Bucklin variant" mentioned below is this: > 1. Voters specify one favorite, and any number of second preferences. > 2. Call the first-preference winner A. All candidates "get" their first > preferences. > 3. All ballots that didn't rank A first, contribute their second prefs. > 4. If A doesn't have the most prefs, add in the second prefs of voters > who ranked A first and elect whoever has the most. Otherwise, elect A. > > This method guarantees LNHarm to the A voters (at least in that a second > pref can't hurt A... certainly second preferences could hurt each other) > and also has an interesting placement on the map. > > If you knew your candidate was not A, though, you are guaranteed that your second-place votes will count, perhaps against your first-place one. In particular, I think that the primary frontrunner would have a very hard time getting second-place votes. Not that that represents a particularly rational strategy for maximizing expectations, but that it is too obvious and easy a strategy for minimizing regret.
In other words, this is not my favorite Bucklin/MCA variant. If you want to discourage truncation in MCA, I think that you should use truncation-resistant systems as symmetrical tiebreakers for multiple or failed majorities. Most people will see that a truncation arms race runs from a multiple majority down to a failed majority, see that the truncation fails at both endpoints, and not worry too much about the places in the middle where it might succeed. Jameson Jameson
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