Researching Majority Judgement book led me to a critique of this procedure:
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24213/1/The_Majority_Judgement_voting_procedure_%28LSERO%29.pdf Basically, they give two problems with MJ that they consider serious: 1. Strategy is possible. 2. Seriously nonmajoritarian results are possible if most preferences between two candidates do not straddle the median. For instance: 49: A10, B7 2: A4, B5 49: A3, B0 Although 98 voters prefer A by 3 levels, 2 voters elect B. Their second objection is easily addressed by offering only 3 rating levels. I think that avoiding this objection is worth the reduced expressivity. The first objection is tougher to resolve. While F&M do not analyze the probability or the nature of possible strategies, I believe that the only serious practical problem is with truncation between two near clones. As I've recently argued on this list, I believe that an asset-like procedure to resolve ties can acceptably minimize the bad effects of this possibility. Furthermore, I feel that even the basic Majority Judgement system, or another MCA system which doesn't specifically address this issue, is preferable to most alternatives. Specifically, I feel that MJ would give better Bayesian regret, and is in most cases simpler, than any Condorcet system; is more expressive than approval; and there is less of a strategic imperative / nonstrategic penalty than with range. (Note that the latter two systems share the near-clone truncation problem). Jameson Quinn
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
