Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi all,
I'm working on another simulation. It is for 3-candidate elections and
allows these ballot types (if the method also allows them):
A (bullet vote)
A>B>C (strict)
A=B>C (tied at the top)
A|B>C (middle candidate ranked but "disapproved")
This should be enough to handle most rank or 2- or 3-slot methods.
The voters have some intelligence, and polling opportunity, so a method
like "elect the guy with the most last preferences" should do just as well
as Plurality.
They can be a little superstitious, especially with random methods: e.g.
Random Ballot isn't perceived as strategy-free. And there can be e.g.
burial in IRV from voters who never managed to be harmed by it.
How is this superstition (on the one hand) and intelligence (on the
other) implemented?
Also do voters who favor one of the candidates have greater intelligence
than those who favor others? If you had a computer that could strategize
on behalf of every voter, you would in effect have a DSV method, and the
DSV method might not be all that bad. However, if one of the
parties/candidates are better at coordinating their voters and executing
strategy, they may snatch the victory from the "honest" winner. Thus,
the worst case in strategy might be when all strategize (in mutually
limiting scenarios like Plurality's lesser evil situation), or when only
some do, and if you want to check the impact of strategy, you might want
to check both cases.
Anyway, I'm interested in methods that might pose a challenge to my
voters (such as perhaps deterministic methods that fail majority favorite;
I have very few of these), or methods that might actually be good...
Every positional method except Plurality fails majority favorite. Range
fails it as well, and Approval might if you interpret it a certain way.
You might also test Random Pair and Hay, if that's feasible within your
simulator. Both are strategyproof. Random Pair picks two candidates at
random and elects the one who beats the other Pairwise. Hay is described
here: http://www.spaceandgames.com/?p=8 and there's a (very complex,
cloneproof?) iterated version at
http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html .
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