Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Ven 18.3.11, Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> a écrit :
Great results.
I think it would help if you gave the SCWE of each method above the table, and
the SCWE of each line after that line. That way, we could see which strategies
were causing the problems with SCWE. Also, if you give further scenarios, it
would be great to see the results sorted by SCWE.
Well, I tried to sort them thematically this time. I wasn't going to discuss
scores at all
at first, as there are just too many things I could say.
One thing that strikes me is that often the methods with strategy
vulnerabilities were
better anyway, in this scenario. Sincerity doesn't necessarily translate
to quality.
I can understand wanting to understand the outcome of each "line" though...
I'll have
to think about that.
I would be interested to see results for MCA runoff methods with this. The
possibilities are:
MCA-Runoff-approval - runoff if tied median, two candidates with highest
portion at median advance (or highest approvals if failed majorities)
(I suspect the top result for this would be ---TTTT, with very high SCWE)
MCA-Runoff-preferred - as above, two winning candidates with highest top
ranking advance.
(I suspect that the top result would be MMMTTTT, with high SCWE)
Ok, I can add these. I think there is a large Condorcet advantage to the runoff
methods.
I do wonder about the clone issue though. It won't show up in this setting, but
if there
were no candidate limit candidates might end up nominated in pairs.
Both of those systems will generally agree with the corresponding MCA-Asset
version. The exception is that MCA-Asset will almost always elect C if B is
eliminated (ineligible for transfers), while MCA-Runoff will tend to elect A in
that situation. That's because B will transfer votes to C even though some of
those original voters might have preferred the less-extreme A. Since both of
these results are probably Condorcet failures anyway, the only important
difference resulting would be if under MCA-Asset, C voters were more inclined
to truncate, while under MCA-Runoff, A voters would do so. However, since the
other side always has a defense, I don't think either of those would hurt the
SCWE. Still, it might be worth simulating MCA asset (assuming that B would
always choose to transfer votes to C, and C and A to B; and that A would
transfer votes to B if they could and C couldn't, that is, that A would believe
the implicit threat of B to transfer to C.)
It is probably possible to do this for spectrum-based scenarios. I can't
remember
what the conditions are for this to happen under that method; I wonder if you
have it
handy.
If you're adding in these methods, you should add Majority Judgement as well
(eliminate median votes to break ties). This would probably come out the same
as MCA, but it is not quite identical, so it would be good to confirm that.
I'm not sure I have understood how this method works. Can you describe it?
Anyway. As to your actual results, it seems to me that the "good" methods are
the ones above 95%. Out of that set, it seems to me that it's clear that MCA
and Bucklin are the simplest methods to explain to voters. (Of course, the
MCA-runoff and -asset methods I propose are complex, not simple).
So, I'd like to see someone make a good argument against MCA being the best
practical single-winner reform, for combination of simplicity and strategy
resistance. There may be such an argument which I'm just too biased to see. If
not... well, all y'all can unite under my banner at last :).
Well, we need to do more scenarios. I don't know if my first post, around a
week ago,
made it to the list. But (assuming I'm looking at the right Excel file at the
moment)
MCA placed fifteenth there, after methods like DMC and margins.
In a non-spectrum-based set of trials, MCA was bottom half. The best SCWE was
actually TTR. I tend to think the quality of MCA etc. depends on the voter
preferences
being distributed in a certain way. If presence or absence of a top-slot
majority doesn't
inform much in the given scenario, it will boil down to Approval.
Plus sincere Condorcet efficiency is just one thing. We could talk about
election of
utility maximizers, average utility, Condorcet losers, utility minimizers. I'm
also
concerned about the possibility that some methods just won't support three
candidates
in practice. That may not be relevant to MCA though.
My initial bets are on AWP implicit because I don't remember ever seeing it
place badly,
so far.
Kevin
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