robert bristow-johnson wrote ... > i *know* i loosened a few IRV supporters here in Burlington. > but, > unfortunately, the "Keep Voting Simple" side that brought us > back to > Plurality and Delayed Runoff believe that God herself has > ordained the > vote-for-only-one ballot. we won't be revisiting anything with > a > ranked ballot again in my lifetime.
If they are dead set against anything except "vote-for-only-one" ballots, then the best they can do is Asset Voting. Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote ... > Whether or not they're pursuing IRV for its own sake (and think > it's a > good singlewinner method) or they're doing it to have IRV be a > steppingstone to STV, I don't know. Asset Voting is just as simple in its single and multi- winner forms, so IRV has no advantage here over Asset Voting. ----- Original Message ----- From: [email protected] Date: Thursday, May 12, 2011 12:01 pm Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 83, Issue 14 To: [email protected] > Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to > [email protected] > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods- > electorama.com > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > [email protected] > > You can reach the person managing the list at > [email protected] > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: eliminate the plurality loser until there is a Condorcet > winner ([email protected]) > 2. Re: electing a variable number of seats ([email protected]) > 3. Re: eliminate the plurality loser until there is a Condorcet > winner (robert bristow-johnson) > 4. Re: eliminate the plurality loser until there is a Condorcet > winner (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------- > ----- > > Message: 1 > Date: Wed, 11 May 2011 19:51:24 +0000 (GMT) > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [EM] eliminate the plurality loser until there is a > Condorcet winner > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > > James Green-Armytage asked > > Quick question for everyone: Do you happen to know when the > method > described in the subject line (eliminate the plurality loser > until > there is a Condorcet winner) was first proposed? > > Forest's attempt at an answer: > > I don't know about "first proposed," but I know that we > considered it in passing > when we came up with the DMC proposal, one of whose many > formulations is to > eliminate the approval loser (or candidate ranked on the fewest > number of > ballots) until there is a Condorcet Winner. > > We settled on Approval instead of Plurality as the basis for > elimination because > it seemed a lot better at the time. It turns out that DMC is > monotonic, for > example, while the Plurality based method is not. > > Long before that (about ten years ago) I suggested a lot of > different tweaks on > IRV that would make it Condorcet compliant in an attempt to show > IRV supporters > how easy it would be to keep IRV from discarding the "true > majority winner." > Mike Ossipoff advised me to forget it, because (having been > rebuffed himself > after proposing all of these ideas and more) he had found out by > sad experience > that the hard core IRV supporters were too closed minded to even > consideranything other than pure Hare/STV/AV/IRV. Since that > time I have found a few > staunch IRV supporters that are willing to think about other > possibilities, but > on the whole Mike seems to have been right. > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Thu, 12 May 2011 00:35:07 +0000 (GMT) > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [EM] electing a variable number of seats > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > > Raph Frank wrote ... > ________________________________________ > On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 7:54 AM, Juho Laatu > yahoo.co.uk> wrote: > > If you want to keep this property, the approach proposed by > Michael Rouse could determine > > the number of board members. If most votes go to few > candidates, then there would be 5 members > > (with different weight). If the votes are more distributed, > then all candidates (up to 9 candidates) > > that get support over some agreed limit would be elected. > Alternatively one could use the number > > of unrepresented votes as the criterion on how many members to > elect. This approach would > > improve proportionality and keep the size of the board small > at the same time. > > You could still use PR-STV to give a proportional result. > > There is a formula which defines the "effective number of parties". > It is also used in economics to define how many firms there are > in a > market. > > The formula is > > 1/sum((vote share squared)) > > So, if the first choice totals were > > A: 20% > B: 30% > C: 15% > D: 12% > E: 18% > F: 5% > > The result gives: > > 1/(0.2*0.2 + 0.3*0.3 + 0.15*0.15 + 0.12*0.12 + 0.18*0.18 + > 0.05*0.05) = 4.96 > > This says that there are around 5 groups in the vote, which is > about right. > > If the voters were less concentrated, you get a larger number > > A: 8% > B: 12% > C: 7% > D: 14% > E: 6% > F: 10% > G: 9% > H: 11% > I: 4% > K: 19% > > would give 8.56 > > The rule could be that you use that formula using the first choice > votes and round to the nearest whole number between 5 and 9. > > Also, a property of the formula is that if the votes are exactly > evenly distributed, then the number will be equal to the number of > candidates. For example, if there were 8 candidates and each got > exactly 1/8 of the vote, then the number of seats would be equal > to 8. > > You can then use standard PR-STV with that number as the seats target. > > Forest replies: > > Or, once you have decided on the number n of seats. you could > complete the election with Asset > Voting: the candidates get together and negotiate the > redistribution of votes until n candidates have the > quota of 100%/(n+1) or more of the votes. If (n+1) candidates > tie with exactly this quota, then elect all of > the tied candidates. > > This way you wouldn't have to have each voter rank the candidates. > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Wed, 11 May 2011 21:35:16 -0400 > From: robert bristow-johnson > To: [email protected] > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [EM] eliminate the plurality loser until there is a > Condorcet winner > Message-ID: > <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed; delsp=yes > > > On May 11, 2011, at 3:51 PM, [email protected] wrote: > > > > > James Green-Armytage asked > > > > Quick question for everyone: Do you happen to know when the method > > described in the subject line (eliminate the plurality loser until > > there is a Condorcet winner) was first proposed? > > by Plurality Loser, do you mean the candidate who was ranked 1st > the > fewest times or the candidate ranked last the most times (all > who are > unranked are tied for last place)? > > i made mention of either in a paper i wrote in 2009 ("The > Failure of > Instant Runoff Voting to accomplish the very purposes for which > it was > adopted: An object lesson in Burlington Vermont") right after i > figgered out that the Condorcet winner was not the same as the > IRV > winner (and happened to be the candidate i supported). > > i would think that this would have preceded by anyone thinking > about > Condorcet cycle for a minute. > > > Forest's attempt at an answer: > > > > I don't know about "first proposed," but I know that we > considered > > it in passing > > when we came up with the DMC proposal, one of whose many > > formulations is to > > eliminate the approval loser (or candidate ranked on the > fewest > > number of > > ballots) until there is a Condorcet Winner. > > > > We settled on Approval instead of Plurality as the basis for > > elimination because > > it seemed a lot better at the time. It turns out that DMC is > > monotonic, for > > example, while the Plurality based method is not. > > > > Long before that (about ten years ago) I suggested a lot of > > different tweaks on > > IRV that would make it Condorcet compliant in an attempt to > show IRV > > supporters > > how easy it would be to keep IRV from discarding the "true > majority > > winner." > > i was impressed with the bottom-two runoff (BTR) in that it's > such a > small change to the existing IRV method used in a few places > (and used > to be in my place). > > but i've been thinking that, while BTR or some other Condorcet > compliant IRV is better than a Condorcet non-compliant IRV, it's > still > IRV and the actual method of tabulation does not allow for > precinct > summability. if you demand precinct summability (for reasons of > > transparency in elections), then it really has to be a simple > Condorcet method where you count pairwise tallies locally, post > publicly and transmit upward the pairwise subtotals. the > election > should be decided solely by the totals from the pairwise > subtotals. > if Ranked Pairs or Schulze is used, the difference between > totals of a > pair of candidates, the "defeat strength", is part of the > decision, > but it is a derived value from the pairwise totals. > > > Mike Ossipoff advised me to forget it, because (having been > rebuffed > > himself > > after proposing all of these ideas and more) he had found out > by sad > > experience > > that the hard core IRV supporters were too closed minded > > i *know* i loosened a few IRV supporters here in Burlington. > but, > unfortunately, the "Keep Voting Simple" side that brought us > back to > Plurality and Delayed Runoff believe that God herself has > ordained the > vote-for-only-one ballot. we won't be revisiting anything with > a > ranked ballot again in my lifetime. i hope i'm wrong about that. > > > to even consider > > anything other than pure Hare/STV/AV/IRV. Since that time I > have > > found a few > > staunch IRV supporters that are willing to think about other > > possibilities, but > > on the whole Mike seems to have been right. > > well, when a few more towns toss out IRV, i hope that FairVote > gets > the message and starts promoting other tabulation methods than > STV > with the ranked ballot. what makes me so mad is that Burlington > > people that are IRV supporters (because they are election reform > > people and do not believe in the two-party religion), these > people had > no idea that there was another way to look at those very same > ballots. Fairvote essentially sold ranked-choice voting with > IRV as > if they were the same thing. as if there *is* no ranked-choice > voting > without IRV. > > -- > > r b-j [email protected] > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 4 > Date: Thu, 12 May 2011 10:38:48 +0200 > From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm > To: robert bristow-johnson > Cc: [email protected], [email protected] > Subject: Re: [EM] eliminate the plurality loser until there is a > Condorcet winner > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed > > robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > > > On May 11, 2011, at 3:51 PM, [email protected] wrote: > > > >> > >> James Green-Armytage asked > >> > >> Quick question for everyone: Do you happen to know when the method > >> described in the subject line (eliminate the plurality loser until > >> there is a Condorcet winner) was first proposed? > > > > by Plurality Loser, do you mean the candidate who was ranked > 1st the > > fewest times or the candidate ranked last the most times (all > who are > > unranked are tied for last place)? > > The Plurality loser is the one who ranks last (loser) in the ordering > given by Plurality. Hence, among those that you state, it is the > former.Essentially, it is IRV, but at every step, you check if > there's a CW > among the candidates remaining; if there is, that person is > elected and > you're done. > > > > i made mention of either in a paper i wrote in 2009 ("The > Failure of > > Instant Runoff Voting to accomplish the very purposes for > which it was > > adopted: An object lesson in Burlington Vermont") right after > i figgered > > out that the Condorcet winner was not the same as the IRV > winner (and > > happened to be the candidate i supported). > > > > i would think that this would have preceded by anyone thinking > about > > Condorcet cycle for a minute. > > Another way of getting a Condorcet compliant runoff method is to > do IRV > with Borda (Nanson's method), or better, eliminate-below-mean- > scores IRV > with Borda (Baldwin's method). These methods have actually been > used in > the real political world, which is not something many Condorcet > methodscan say, and apparently they also elect from the Smith > set. Being runoff > methods, however, they are not monotone, and I remember reading that > they're quite manipulable. > > > well, when a few more towns toss out IRV, i hope that FairVote > gets the > > message and starts promoting other tabulation methods than STV > with the > > ranked ballot. what makes me so mad is that Burlington people > that are > > IRV supporters (because they are election reform people and do > not > > believe in the two-party religion), these people had no idea > that there > > was another way to look at those very same ballots. Fairvote > > essentially sold ranked-choice voting with IRV as if they were > the same > > thing. as if there *is* no ranked-choice voting without IRV. > > FV didn't swerve in their game of chicken, so to speak. They > decided to > link ranked ballots directly to IRV, presumably so that when > people get > the (commonsense) idea that perhaps ranking would help break the > nationout of the two-party stranglehold, they'll immediately > think of IRV. > That strategy does have its benefits from FV's point of view, > since it > makes it more likely that people will pass IRV, but it also is very > damaging against the ranked ballot concept in general if/when people > then find IRV not good enough. > > Whether or not they're pursuing IRV for its own sake (and think > it's a > good singlewinner method) or they're doing it to have IRV be a > steppingstone to STV, I don't know. > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods- > electorama.com > > End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 83, Issue 14 > ************************************************ > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
