Hi Kevin, answers and questions in the text of your email below.
Best regards Peter Zborník On Thu, May 26, 2011 at 5:12 PM, Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Peter, > > You are right. Your treatment has been discussed for, I suppose, 15+ years > on this list, and your reasoning for it is a major factor. > > --- En date de : Jeu 26.5.11, Peter Zbornik <[email protected]> a écrit : > Kevin Venzke wrote in his mail below (May 9th 2010): > 35 A>B > 25 B > 40 C > A will win. This is only acceptable when you assume that the B and C > voters meant to say that A is just as good as the other candidate that > they didn't rank. I don't think this is likely to be what voters expect. > It seems misleading to even allow truncation as an option if it's treated > like this. > End of quote > > you wrote: > Well I think think that as a voter I would indeed be pleased if A would win > and not C. > If the completion system above would be used (i.e. A=B would be counted as > 0.5 win for A vs B and 0.5 win for B vs A), then there the winner would > always be the same disregarding which of the following winning criteria was > used: winning votes, losing votes, margins or quotas. > > [end quote] > > Can you explain why as a voter you would be pleased if A won and not C? > What reason do these ballots give us to suppose that A is a better > candidate than C? Does the fact that A voters have a second preference > make A a better candidate? I aggree that the issue of incomplete ballots or partially blank votes as I would call it, is not as clear cut as I thought in the post above. Please refer to the discussion in the email to Kristoffer. > > In other words: Electing A violates Woodall's Plurality criterion. I aggree. > > I don't find the election of C to be very good, but it is better than > electing A. > > > [resume quote] > Let us analyse the example in your mail below. We apply the Schulze > beatpath with different criteria (biggest win, margins and ratios): > [end quote] > > I think you forgot Schulze as it is usually done: Weakest biggest loss. > With "weakest biggest loss", do you mean losing votes ( http://m-schulze.webhop.net/, page 7)? > In that case you elect B, which is my preference. This minimizes the > number of voters who feel the outcome was spoiled by one of the > candidates. > > > [resume quote] > What are the pros and cons of the approach above? > Prima facie it seems that the treatment of hybrid ballots above could solve > the problem of bullet voting, but I am far from sure. > [end quote] > > I still stand by what I originally said, that I don't believe voters will > expect or like this treatment of truncation. Voters will expect that if > more than half of the voters say X was better than Y, then that's the > important contest, and Y should certainly not win. The presence of some > weak candidate Z should not cause the method to be confused about X vs. > Y. > Yes, that depends if the voters think Woodall's plurality criterion is important. I think the goal of STV elections should be proportional representation, which might (or might not) be hampered by the plurality criterion. See the discussion in my response to Kristoffer's email. > > You will tell them you're only doing this for their own good. But I > think there is an incurable disconnect between what truncation seems to > mean and what it actually does mean in your scheme. I think that when > you use this scheme, truncation should not be allowed at all: You should > have to explicitly rank all the worst candidates equal, if that's how > it's going to count. > > Otherwise, you are going to sometimes be electing candidates on the basis > of equal rankings that were cast in the form of voters completely ignoring > a candidate. That seems like an opportunity to criticize the legitimacy > of the winner. With this I do aggree. > > Experimentally, in simulations: When you treat equal-ranking as split > votes, voters will have to compromise more often, instead of just > compressing the top ranks. This suggests weaker, non-frontrunner > candidates are more likely to be best advised to drop out of the race, > because their presence is more likely to harm the voters that support > them. > Could you please send me a link to these simulations? > > Kevin > >
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