Hi Juho, --- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu <[email protected]> a écrit : > > I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one, > else elect the > > candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the > greatest number of ballots" is plenty simple, and is much > > more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in other > respects. > > In what sense is the above mentioned "implicit approval > cutoff" + Approval to resolve is the best "simple" method? > If compared to MinMax, is it maybe easier to explain to the > voters, more strategy free, or yields better winners? Would > an explicit approval cutoff be fine (to allow full rankings > to be given)?
It is surely easier to explain than MinMax, has more obvious burial disincentive (especially if the comparison is to margins), and, in my view, gives comparably good winners to WV, but more attention may need to be placed on where to stop ranking than under WV. (In practice, I would not plan to rank any lower than could possibly help me in WV, so I would probably vote the same under both methods.) The favorite betrayal incentive is worse than WV though. (This is where I should plug my ICA method, which satisfies FBC. But it's more complicated.) An explicit approval cutoff in this method is not fine at all: You will lose the burial disincentive. You would be able to try to stop your opponents from winning as CW without hurting your own candidate's odds to win that way, and then in the approval count you would not have to stand by the pawn candidates you voted for. This strategy would only backfire when too many voters try it and make a pawn candidate the CW. --- Also, the reason I don't need to see Smith in this method is that unlike MinMax, where there isn't an obvious justification for failing Smith, in C//A the second step is a completely different method. If one doesn't think that Approval can justify itself, then I doubt C//A is attractive anyway. Kevin ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
