That I'm aware of, favorite betrayal is almost always a tool to help someone besides your favorite. Think of plurality: you vote the "lesser evil".
Only in a non-monotonic method could it be otherwise. The only non-monotonic methods worth even mentioning are runoff methods. Jameson 2011/6/6 Peter Zbornik <[email protected]> > Dear all, > > two clarifications. > With "favorite" i mean the "sincere favorite" below. > > A correction of an unfinished sentence (addition in CAPITALS): > MFBC and MSFBC say basically, that if some of the voters who have A as > a first preference (i.e. vote A>(OR =)...[the other candidates]) in an > election where A does not win, change preferences between A and the > other candidates so, that A is less prefered than before (example A>B > turns to B>A, A=B turns to B>A, A>B turns to A=B) and the preference > between the other candidates (excluding A) do not change (i.e. it is > not allowed for B>C to turn B=C or C>B) THEN CANDIDATE A CANNOT WIN > EITHER. > > Basically, you cannot make your losing (sincere) favorite win by > ranking him lower, if he didn't win before. > > Best regards > Peter Zborník > > On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 8:42 PM, Peter Zbornik <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear Markus Schulze and all others, > > > > Thanks for the example. > > I messed things up a bit with a bad definition, my appologies. > > What I would like to see was a violation of a weaker criterion (that > > is clear from the example specification). > > > > What I would like then to see a proof of violation, is a less general > > l variant of FBC (changes to FBC in capitals): > > 1. MFBC: A voting method satisfies the Modified Favorite Betrayal > > Criterion (MFBC) if there do not exist situations where a voter is > > only able to obtain A WIN FOR HIS OR HER FAVORITE by insincerely > > listing another candidate ahead of his or her sincere favorite WHILE > > THE PREFERENCES BETWEEN THE OTHER CANDIDATES REMAIN UNCHANGED. > > > > and conversly > > > > 2. MSFBC: A voting method satisfies the Modified Strong Favorite > > Betrayal Criterion (SFBC) if there do not exist situations where a > > voter is only able to obtain a A WIN FOR HIS OR HER FAVORITE by > > insincerely listing another candidate ahead of or equal to his or her > > sincere favorite WHILE THE PREFERENCES BETWEEN THE OTHER CANDIDATES > > REMAIN UNCHANGED. > > > > MFBC and MSFBC say basically, that if some of the voters who have A as > > a first preference (i.e. vote A>...[the other candidates]) in an > > election where A does not win, change preferences between A and the > > other candidates so, that A is less prefered than before (example A>B > > turns to B>A, A=B turns to B>A, A>B turns to A=B) and the preferences > > between the other candidates (excluding A) do not change (i.e. it is > > not allowed for B>C to turn B=C or C>B). > > > > I wanted to say (but didn't do very clearly) is that MFBC and MSFBC > > hold for all Condorcet (Shulze reference) elections. > > > > Sorry for that and thanks for the example. > > > > So I lost challenge one due to a messy specification, that counts too. > > > > So challenge 2 is to prove MFBC and MSFBC are violated for Condorcet > > elections with or without generalized symmetric completion. > > > > Maybe the result that MFBC and MSFBC hold is trivial, or stems from > > some other result, like consistency. > > > > Best regards > > Peter Zborník > > > > On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 7:30 PM, Markus Schulze > > <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-May/015945.html > >> > >> ---- > >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list > info > >> > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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