[email protected] wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelmwrote ...
Some methods pass the Condorcet criterion without seeming
Condorcet-like
at all.
Here's a good example:
Initialize a variable X to be the candidate with the most approval.
While X is covered, let the new value of X be the highest approval candidate
that covers the old X.
Elect the final value of X.
For all practical purposes this is just a seamless version of C//A, i.e. it avoids the apparent
abandonment of Condorcet in favor of Approval after testing for a CW.
Assuming cardinal ballots, candidate A covers candidate B, iff whenever B is rated above C on more
ballots than not, the same is true for A, and (additionally) A beats (in this same pairwise sense) some
candidate that B does not.
I would prefer this to C//A (even though I would prefer methods without
approval cutoffs to both). However, it is more complex and the logic is
harder to get at by the public, kind of like Ranked Pairs in that respect.
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