> > > If you want something that deters burial strategy, how about what I called > FPC? Each candidate's penalty is equal to the number of first-place votes > for those who beat him pairwise. Lowest penalty wins. > Burying a candidate may help in engineering a cycle, but it can't stack > more first-place votes against him. Unfortunately, it's not monotone. >
Of course, this causes favorite betrayal strategy, because you may care more about giving a penalty than about helping your honest favorite. And this strategy is "obvious" enough that I think people would overuse it, even when there was an honest CW (for instance, Nader voters in a Nader/Gore/Bush scenario). One way to avoid such "overfitting" (solving one problem but causing another) is to have a runoff between the winners of two different methods, if they differ. For instance, minimax and FPC. Of course, that throws simplicity entirely out the window. > > Finding the most strategy-resistant monotone Condorcet method is an > interesting problem. If you permit approval cutoffs, UncAAO and C//A are > probably quite good, but if not... what, I wonder? Perhaps some Ranked Pairs > variant where winning contests are sorted ahead of losing contests, and then > sorted further by FPP score of the first person in the ordering (e.g. A for > A>B and B for B>A)? Or some Maxtree generalization. Who knows? > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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