Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I consider a major defect.
OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed at the top of this thread, except that voters can vote for more than one candidate, as in Approval Voting. How does that stack up? By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't consider it a "practical reform proposal." It's way too complicated to ever be adopted for major public elections. The method I just proposed is already pushing the limit for complexity, and it is much simpler than SODA. Regards, Russ P. On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>wrote: > A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a > majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that > Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd > disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects > of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, > SODA<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA>, > is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real > hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here. > > With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. > First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, > because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads > inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way > that can clearly be criticized as "spoiled" (the centrist would have won > pairwise) and "nonmonotonic" (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to > lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not > transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage > compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, > and their votes transferred more than once before the final result. > > Cheers, > Jameson > > 2011/7/4 Russ Paielli <[email protected]> > >> Hello, >> >> I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years >> ago. How is everyone doing? >> >> I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a >> good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if >> so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works: >> >> The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the >> US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are >> counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the >> candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the >> same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority. >> >> The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as >> follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list >> of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference >> matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The >> bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes >> automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her >> preference list. >> >> The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles >> IRV, but note that this method is "summable" -- a major advantage over IRV, >> eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I >> think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV. >> What do you think? Thanks. >> >> Russ P. >> >> -- >> http://RussP.us >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >> > -- http://RussP.us
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