On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:20 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[email protected]> wrote:
> If you want to minimize unhappiness of the voters by electing candidates > hated by few, you can make the same kind of argument against the majority > criterion for a single-winner method as you did against the Droop > proportionality criterion. That is, imagine an election of the sort: > > 51: Left > Center > Right > 45: Right > Center > Left > 4: Center > Right > Left. > > The majority criterion forces Left to win in a single-winner election. > However, Left is hated by 49% of the voters. Yes. Of course I totally agree that with a rank choice ballot, the Droop quota also is not a good idea. (Droop quota is the same as majority in a single winner election.) > > Borda, which fails the majority criterion, would elect Center as a > compromise. Center is not hated by any of the voters, and so by your metric, > that would be a better outcome. Yes. I agree completely with that. > > Yet I suppose that since you like the Condorcet criterion, you also like > the majority criterion that it implies. That means that some methods (like > Borda) can be *too* centrist by your/the Condorcet measure. Huh!? One obviously is not equivalent to the other, so "No". Sorry. Too busy today to go through the rest of your statements currently. -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
