To be clear: if X and Y are the same, there's no need for a runoff? 2011/7/23 <[email protected]>
> If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies the majority > criterion, then you can skip step > one, and the method becomes smoother. > > Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the majority > criterion: DSC, Bucklin, and the > following range ballot based method: > > Elect the candidate X with the greatest value of p such that more than p/2 > percent of the ballots rate X at > least p percent of the maxRange value. > > That method is similar to the one that Andy Jennings suggested recently, > and which I think could be the > method to choose the other finalist: > > Elect the candidate Y with the greatest value of p such that at least p > percent of the ballots rate Y at p > percent of the maxRange value or higher. > > If these last two methods are used to choose the finalists, X and Y, then a > strict majority top rated > candidate will automatically win. The voters don't have to agonize over > approval cutoffs, they can just > grade the candidates on a scale of zero to maxRange. In fact that's what > Andy had in mind ... an > approval-like method that sets the cutoff level (in the sense that Bucklin > can be thought of as a method > for setting the approval cutoff level), but in a more robust way than > Bucklin. In addition the composite > method is monotone, and at least marginally clone independent (i.e. in the > same way that Range is).. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
