> I don't necessarily think sophisticated voters are required in order to > ensure reasonable PR under PRV. I think as long as you don't get some > candidates who have much better strategic voters than others, it should do > OK. >
You should read some of Schulze's papers about the history of free riding. It seems clear from those examples that there are examples of parties with better or worse free-riding vote-management capabilities. So I would worry about this distorting results. > Separate constituencies do spoil proportionality to an extent, yes. There > would only be a certain number of seats available in each. If it was six, > then a party with constant 10% support across the county would struggle to > get anything. What's the alternative? We could have bigger constituencies, > but that means bigger ballots, or party lists, but I don't like them. I'm > not sure I get your district/co-district thing though. In any case, I think > this is a problem of how we sort out districts/constituencies, rather than > anything against PRV per se. > > Also, I don't get the whole thing about write-ins. Maybe it's a UK/US > divide thing, but surely if you want to be elected then you stand for > election. Therefore your name would be on the ballot. > US elections typically have space for write-ins, and occasionally a candidate who did not make it onto the ballot (most frequently, because they lost a party primary; but sometimes for other reasons) will mount a "write in campaign". The current governor of Alaska is one such, I think; or is it senator? But in SODA-PR, the "districts", "co-districts", and "write-ins" are merely a way to avoid ballot clutter. If there are 40 seats being elected at once, that could easily lead to close to 100 candidates. By only listing the same-district candidates on the ballot, voters are encouraged to focus on the few candidates near them. Voters who want more choice can look down to the candidates from the 1 or 2 "co-districts". And voters who want all the choices would have to research the candidates beforehand and write-in their names. It is purely a matter of ballot design; but it would reassure existing single-district winners that they would still have a "constituency" under the new system. JQ > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> > *To:* [email protected] > *Sent:* Sun, 24 July, 2011 5:38:18 > *Subject:* Re: [EM] PR for USA or UK > > >Hi Toby, > > Hello. > > >I really don't know what "dishonest results" means. Judging by your > >example below it apparently requires comparing two different methods. > >So, I can make any method give "dishonest results" just by inventing > >a different method that requires dishonesty from everyone. Now every > >other method in the world is cheating. > > I suppose what I mean is that by transferrig your vote for you, STV ends up > producing the same result (in my simple case) as PRV with strategic voting, > and to me it's an ugly result. > > >It's not a bad description that strategy-resistant systems "do the > >strategy for you." This has important results: > > >1. The voters do not need to do the strategy > >2. So the playing field is leveled > >3. So votes should have correct effect in proportion to the number, > >meaning the outcome is more accurate. That is, it reflects better the > >overall preferences of the electorate. > > Strategy-resistant systems do have certain advantages as you say, but in > the single-winner case it would end up reducing range to a Condorcet method, > which arguably isn't as good, and ends up pushing out a "better-liked" > candidate for one that strictly more people prefer. And this is what I like > about range - it's not just about which candidates you prefer to which other > ones, but by how much. And as long as strategy isn't performed better by > voters of some candidates than others, the fact that there would still be > some honest voters would mean that the advantages of range would still > remain to an extent, meaning that overall better-liked candidates stand a > better chance, and it therefore reflects better the overall preferences of > the electorate! > > >>On my website I give an example where party A has 68% of the support > >>and party B 32%. There are two seats and so each party fields two > >>candidates. Assuming everyone would vote approval style, under my > >>system, they would win one each. Party A would need over 75% of the > >>votes to win the second seat. I would argue that this is a fair result > >>(75% being bang in the middle between 50% and 100% - the amount to > >>exactly earn one and two seats). > > >How is 50% the amount to get one seat? > > I mean that it's the exact proportional amount without any rounding. One > seat = 50% of two seats. That's all I meant. Also 0% is the exact > proportional amount for zero seats and 100% is the exact amount for two > seats, so they have a linear relationship. So it's not too much of a stretch > to say that 75% = 1.5 seats and a reasonable cut-off. > > > >> Of course party A voters could > >>coordinate themselves and split into two factions of 34% to take both > >>seats, but this would be very hard for them to achieve. STV (Droop > >>quota anyway) would transfer the votes above the quota accordingly > >>so that party A would win both seats, and give what I would regard > >>as the less fair result. > > >Ok, but it's not obvious that it is less fair. You are according a > >privilege to the weaker party just because it is a different party. > > I'm not according them a privilege because they are a different party, but > because I would see it as logical and fair that 75% is a reasonable cut-off. > If a system made the cut-off at 80%, I'd argue that it was unfair in favour > of the smaller party. >
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