Kevin wrote: > Well, there aren't technically any (serious) strategy-free methods. I'm > referring more to a method not having obvious strategic incentives, or > at least not having a lot of a single type of strategic incentive, so > that everybody knows that "in method X you should use Y strategy all > the time" etc.
Yes, I can't claim that nonmonotonicity always leads to easily generalizable manipulability. I guess a while back I got pretty discouraged by the weak nonmanipulability guarantees that conventional voting systems can make, which led me to take my DSV research in slightly different directions. I just decided to throw that little "proof" out there since I couldn't remember seeing anything like it before. I don't claim it to be especially graceful or useful, and I'll bet someone's done it better anyway. -- Rob LeGrand [email protected] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
