>>> To review for other readers, we're talking about the scenario >>> >>> 48 A >>> 27 C>B >>> 25 B>C >>> >>> Candidates B and C form a clone set that pairwise beats A, and in fact C >>> is the Condorcet Winner, but >>> under many Condorcet methods, as well as for Range and Approval, there is >>> a large temptation for the >>> 25 B faction to threaten to truncate C, and thereby steal the election >>> from C. Of course C can counter >>> the threat to truncate B, but then A wins. So it is a classical game of >>> "chicken." >>> >>> Some methods like IRV cop out by giving the win to A right off the bat, >>> so there is no game of chicken.
Wait a minute! IRV elects C in this scenario, if that is how the voters actually vote, and those are the sincere preferences (A voters have no preference between B and C). Much as I hate to say it, IRV works OK in that scenario. On the other hand, if the A voters prefer B over C, (as in the 2009 Burlington, VT mayoral election, http://scorevoting.net/Burlington.html) IRV ignores the preference and still elects C, which seems to be the wrong choice. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
