----- Original Message ----- From: Date: Friday, August 12, 2011 3:12 pm Subject: Enhanced DMC To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com,
> > > From: "C.Benham" > > To: election-methods-electorama....@electorama.com > > Subject: [EM] Enhanced DMC > > > Forest, > > The "D" in DMC used to stand for *Definite*. > > Yeah, that's what we finally settled on. > > > > > I like (and I think I'm happy to endorse) this Condorcet > method > > idea, > > and consider it to be clearly better than regular DMC > > > > Could this method give a different winner from the ("Approval > > Chain > > Building" ?) method you mentioned in the "C//A" thread (on 11 > > June 2011)? > > Yes, I'll give an example when I get more time Here's a possible scenario: Suppose that approval order is alphabetical from most approval to least A, B, C, D. Suppose further that pairwise defeats are as follows: C>A>D>B>A together with B>C>D . Then the set P = {A, B} is the set of candidates neither of which is pairwise beaten by anybody with greater approval. Since the approval winner A is not covered by B, it is not covered by any member of P, so the enhanced version of DMC elects A. But A is covered by C so it cannot be elected by any of the chain building methods that elect only from the uncovered set. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info