Well, to repeat a little of what i mailed you earlier, Jameson:
while i may agree with Laslier of the possible truth in fact: "if 49% of the population strongly prefer A to B and 51% slightly prefer B to A, I think that A is collectively preferable" (it *is* ostensibly utilitarian), if one could consistently (for comparison between individuals) and reliably measure individual strength of preference. sure, we can ask them, but every franchised voter is a person of equal worth and everyone's vote is private, everyone can bring their own motivations (including unjust motivations like racial prejudice or debatably justified motivations like religious belief) into the voting booth and express those motives on a secret ballot. no voter can be compelled to reduce their political worth for which they have equal franchise to. so i would fully disagree with the translation of what i think that Laslier is pointing to: "if 49% of the electorate strongly prefer A to B and 51% slightly prefer B to A, the A should be elected" no voter should be made to, and i don't even thing *asked* to, voluntarily reduce the weight their electoral franchise. every person's vote must be of equal value. no voter should be able to "multiply" the effect of their vote (say, by voting twice) which is the fundamental principle behind "one-person-one-vote". it's gonna be pretty hard to get people to part with that principle. presently people are using the two fundamental principles of "Simple Majority" (whatever the hell *that* means, but they all agree what it means for a 2-candidate election) and "one-person-one-vote" to prop up their nearly religious belief that nothing other than a traditional single-vote ballot decided either by FPTP or to-two- runoff. i see no hope of accomplishing voter reform that will be challenged or associated with abandoning either of those two principles. only Condorcet (assuming a Condorcet winner) can be laid against the template of "Simple majority" and "one-person-one-vote" and decide the election *consistently* with every hypothetical race between two candidates. what IRV sorta claimed; that it's equivalent to the old way, but applies the old rules automatically (IRV and Condorcet or any ranked-choice agree that the only meaning to racking A above B is that this voter would vote for A in traditional two-person race between A and B). this justifies some people's support for IRV where it is opaque to every choice a voter has below the first choice, until their first choice is eliminated and some other choice is promoted. but it's really Condorcet that accomplishes doing it the old way, but using the "technology" of requiring of every voter to make up their minds (as if that is such a hardship - to make up your mind about the election by Election Day) about contingency votes (which is what the ranked ballot does, but the Range and Approval ballots do something else). -- r b-j [email protected] "Imagination is more important than knowledge." -----Original Message----- From: "Jameson Quinn" [[email protected]] Date: 08/22/2011 10:14 To: [email protected] CC: [email protected] Subject: Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions I appreciate RBJs analysis of a possible failure mode of approval. Its true, if Approval were implemented and then repealed, that would be a blow to voting reform. However, for me, there are two problems with that. 1. We have ample evidence of voters rejecting IRV - for instance, in the AV question in the UK. We do not have evidence of which other system (Approval, Condorcet, or other) is least likely to be rejected. RBJ believes that Condorcet is better, and therefore safer against repeal, than Approval. Others might dispute either or both of these contentions, and I dont see that we have the empirical data to decide. 2. Reform has at least two failure modes. It can be implemented and then rejected, as RBJ worries; or it can never be implemented in the first place. Our inability as activists to agree on anything, which would be highlighted if we cant agree on a consensus statement, accentuates the possibility of the latter failure. 2a. Id argue that while we cant know whether approval or Condorcet is better proof against repeal, we can be pretty sure that Approval is the most likely to get consensus from theorists. For that, we have not just strong logical arguments (Approval is the simplest system, and represents a step towards any better system); we have empirical evidence. Robert: I would be interested to hear your response to these points JQ ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
