2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell <[email protected]> > On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: > > >> Lundell: > >> Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot > has a pragmatic/operational "meaning" as a function of its use in > determining a winner. > >> > >> But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot > scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one > of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. > > > > --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, > > described here: > > http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html > > the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any > > voter who foolishly > > uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse > > election result in expectation. This was not an "unwarranted leap," > > this was a "new advance" > > because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first > > voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest > > utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. > > It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs > to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to > vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? > > Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A > > B > C. > > On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but > A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? > > In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than a 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance.
JQ
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